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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the financial aspects of the
Battery Park City Development (BPC), a massive 92-acre
urban complex containing the World Financial Center, over
4,000 units of residential living, and numerous public
parks and open space areas. The framework for the capital
structure involves a complex series of partnerships between
the public and private sector as well as between the City
and State of New York. The evolution of these arrangements
and, in particular, the various contractual obligations and
risks of the public sector, are examined to reveal how
this large-scale real estate development blossomed from
the early years of financial disaster to the highly
successful monetary levels it has obtained today.
A financial model has been composed that simulates the
current BPC flow of funds to estimate, given conservative
revenue projections, the magnitude of future resources that
will become available to the City and the State for uses
other than the project itself. Additionally, the impact of
varying economic conditions on BPC's capital structure is
examined to prove the strength of the project's financial
capacity to withstand significant downturns in the local
economy and changing New York tax policy.
The paper concludes by answering what government
entity has gotten what funds for what purpose, and who
can be expected to receive the tremendous benefits the
project will generate in the future. The potential risks,
if any, that lay ahead for the public sector are outlined
to confirm the unlikelihood financial trouble will ever
invade the Battery Park City Development again.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Associate Professor, Department of Urban Studies and
Planning
To my father, Edgar R. Oppenheim
A PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL DREAM:
NEW YORK'S BATTERY PARK CITY DEVELOPMENT
ABSTRACT.................................................. 2
LIST OF EXHIBITS.........................................5
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION...............................6
CHAPTER TWO - THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE: A PROCESS OF
EVOLUTION.................................11
The Partnership(s) Arrangement.............11
Anticipated Lead Time.....................13
Problems with Initial Plan................15
Fiscal Crisis and Reformulation...........16
Benefits of the New Capital Structure.....21
New Era Of Financial Health................22
Leveraging Lease Revenues.................25
Spreading The Wealth......................27
CHAPTER THREE -LEVERAGING THE BENEFITS OF PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT...............................32
From Lease Revenues to Bonded Debt........35
Modelling The Flow of Funds................41
Testing The Sensitivity Of Revenue Flows..53
CHAPTER FOUR - ALTERNATIVE FUNDING FOR THE $600
MILLION HOUSING COMMITMENT................64
Counting on Borrowed Money................65
Recommendation............................79
CHAPTER FIVE- CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATION................83
Who Benefits?.............................84
Risks Ahead...............................97
NOTES .................................................. 102
APPENDIX A - BASE-CASE SCENARIO COMPLETE FINANCIALS.....107
APPENDIX B - ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO COMPLETE FINANCIALS... 114
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Chart 2.1 -
Chart 3.1 -
Figure 3.2-
Graph 3.3 -
Figure 3.4-
Graph 3.5 -
Graph 3.6 -
Chart 4.1 -
Chart 4.2 -
Figure 4.3-
Graph 4.4 -
Graph 4.5 -
Graph 4.6 -
Graph 4.7 -
Figure 5.1-
Figure 5.2-
Figure 5.3-
Graph 5.4 -
Capital Structure of BPCA (1968-1990).
Flow Of Funds.
.......31
....................................... 37
Summary Of Base Case Scenario...........
Application Of Revenues.................
Comparison Of Sensitivity Analysis......
Application of Revenues (Between Scenari
A&C Funding From Excess Revenues........
Base Case Scenario (Flow Chart).........
Alternative Scenario (Flow Chart).......
Comparative Analysis
(With A&C vs. W/Out A&C)................
.... 46
.... 51
.... 56
os).58
.... 59
.... 66
.... 67
.... 69
Funding $600 Million Housing Program......
Base Case Scenario (Components of Funding)
Alternative Scenario(Components of Funding
Freed Monies Due To Leveraging............
Sources and Uses of Bonds Issued By BPCA..
Future Sources and Uses of Funds..........
Combined Current and Future Sources/Uses..
Who Benefits From BPC Funds?..............
.. 72
.. 74
).76
.. 78
.85
.89
.92
.94
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Most people view the Battery Park City development as
a wonderful display of architectural beauty with
prestigious commercial towers and high-rent residential
living. Today, the project consists of more than 6 million
square feet of "electronically smart" office space in four
towers ranging in height from 33 to 51 stories, and two
nine-story octagonal "gate house" buildings. Over 280,000
square feet of retail space surround an 18,500-square-foot
atrium, the "Winter Garden", containing restaurants and
open eating areas for everyone. This spectacular public
space opens onto the North Cove harbor which has become the
resting place for yachts of the rich and famous.
Additionally, a 3.5-acre public plaza facing the Hudson
River provides the breath of fresh air that is often not
found in other Manhattan developments. The residential
components of the project, currently located to the south
of the World Financial Center complex, are comprised of two
phases: the Gateway Plaza and Rector Place. Combined,
close to 4,000 rental housing and condominium units have
been sold or occupied, with future plans to provide 10,000
additional housing units in the next few years. The
commercial and residential components of the project are
effectively connected by a partially completed 1.2-mile
riverfront esplanade and strategically located public parks
and open space. Future plans to complete the esplanade and
create a 30-acre park are currently underway. Throughout
the entire project, consistent architecture exudes the
traditional flavor of New York and successfully connects
quality and beauty into one force.
This massive extension of lower Manhattan will always
be a constant reminder of how responsive city planning and
urban design measures can breed a successful real estate
development. What cannot be seen to the visible eye,
however, are the financial arrangements that have made this
"9th" wonder a reality. Certainly as important, Battery
Park City (BPC)'s capital formation represents a pliable
and creative structure because it has met the demands of
changing economic conditions and emerging opportunities
that have persisted over the twenty year history of the
project. As tomorrow nears, the monetary benefits that the
project promises to provide will spill over the project
itself and benefit other areas of the City. In an attempt
to ascertain these benefits, this paper focuses on the real
hidden treasure of Battery Park City - - its financial
structure.
As a professional in New York during most of the 80's,
my daily commute to work took me directly past the 92-acre
BPC project. My initial recollection was of a site nearly
barren, the exceptions being one residential building,
Gateway Plaza, and the embryonic construction stages of
another. As the years progressed, however, the four
structures comprising the World Financial Center and
several residential projects took full shape as they neared
completion. During this six-year period, questions I often
asked myself was how did such an enormous undertaking get
financed? By whom? How long did it take? Who was
responsible? Does it make money, and if so, for whom? As
could be imagined, the answers to these nagging questions
are not simple. The BPC has not always been successful,
financially, and as a result the capital structure has
undergone change numerous times until the project finally
found itself on firm footings.
Chapter Two of this paper answers "who? and how?" the
project was financed by examining in-depth the composition
of the capital structure of Battery Park City. This
chapter traces the events shaping the BPC's financial
history, starting in 1972 when money was raised to finance
the initial landfill activity up to today's most recent
budget deficit bond issue. The pivotal events that took
place provide insight for the project's financial failures
and successes to date. Additionally, a close examination
of the critical partnership arrangements between the public
and private sector, and more interestingly between the
State and City of New York, provides an understanding of
how the monstrous goals the BPC Authority set out to
achieve were accomplished. Finally, the changing risks and
rewards with each form of the capital structure are
outlined to reveal how a large-scale development like
Battery Park City is financed.
Chapter Three answers the question of whether "the
project makes money and for whom?" by diving into the
intricacies of the capital structure to determine the
revenue capacity of the project. Meeting the current
financial obligations of the project and other programs to
which the public sector is committed is an integral part of
the analysis. Additionally, this chapter examines the
future resources available to the City and State flowing
from the strong revenue stream thrown off by the project.
With a model of simulation designed to imitate the exact
flow of funds I can analyze the impact of varying economic
conditions on BPC's capital structure. My objective is to
demonstrate the strength of the project's financial success
today and its probable success in the future.
Chapter Four pauses to examine a particularly novel
financial arrangement the City, the State, and the BPCA
recently agreed upon. In 1989, the BPCA committed to fund
the final phase of a $1 billion housing program for
rehabilitation of low-and moderate-income units in the
City. The purpose of the program is not at question, but
rather the way it is to be funded. The BPCA has agreed to
pay cash, in specified annual installments, to meet the
$600 million portion of its obligation. This chapter
questions this financial decision and examines an
alternative scenario - - leveraging funds to meet the same
monetary objectives.
Finally, in Chapter Five I answer the "who benefits?"
question by looking at what government entity has gotten
what funds for what purpose, and who can be expected to
receive the benefits the project will generate in the
future. In concluding, I will outline the potential risks,
if any, that lay ahead for the various public and private
partners involved with the project.
By the end, one should have a solid understanding of
the financial inner workings of the BPC project, its
current fiscal objectives and monetary expectations. One
fact did become quite clear to me early in the research
process: this heralded project deserves all of the
acclamations it has received to date, and more. The view
New Yorkers and visitors alike see daily - - an
aesthetically pleasing urban complex - - is equally matched
by the tremendous monetary rewards this public/private
venture has seemingly achieved.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE: A PROCESS OF EVOLUTION
This chapter outlines the capital structure of the
Battery Park City Project (BPC) and how it evolved over
time in response to changing environments. A close
examination of the integral partnerships that were formed
is examined as well as the risks the public and private
sectors undertook at various stages in the financial
process. Chart 2.1 at the end of this chapter
illustrates the key events that helped shape the capital
structure of the BPC. It also outlines all financings and
security sources and provides a visualization of the
financial framework as it is discussed in this chapter.
The Partnership(s) Arrangement
From the earliest conceptual stages of BPC, the
planners and politicians behind the project envisioned a
capital structure built upon two partnerships that would
create the landfill/site and act as master developer of the
project: a public/public partnership between New York City
(the City) and the State of New York (the State) and a
public/private arrangement between a newly created state
Authority and any potential private developers. The public
sector was to be responsible for the creation of the land
and the infrastructure while the private sector would
undertake the risk of developing the commercial and
residential components of the project.
The Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) created by the
New York Legislature in 1968 was the first action taken
towards these goals.[1] The following year the City, as the
owner/landlord of the site, entered into a 99-year ground
lease with BPCA as the tenant. Under this structure, the
City, as owner of the site, had significant responsibility
for planning and development of the project. The State
planned to provide financial support by lending its "moral"
obligation on any bonds issued to finance the landfill
while the project was in its non-revenue generating phase.
Any bonds issued by the BPCA would not be backed by the
full faith and credit of the State (and could not absent
approval by a majority of voters in a state-wide election),
therefore the State's promise to assure any debt repayment
would be moral rather than legal.[2] As the project
progressed, both the City and the State anticipated that
the public sector, acting through the newly created BPCA,
would enter into various partnership agreements with
private sector developers who would construct the
commercial and residential projects on the site in
accordance with the 1969 BPC Master Plan. Residential uses
predominated in this original plan while the commercial
offices that were to become the core of BPC's financial
success took secondary priority. Small in size and planned
for non-prime location in the distant southern part of the
site, the commercial zone was considered an orphan.
At this point the project's initial risks were
evident. The public sector was taking all the
pre-development risks associated with the creation of the
land. Since the BPCA would not be developing
revenue-producing uses, the future success or failure of
the project hinged on its ability to enter into
partnerships with the private sector. Conversely, the
private sector's involvement in the project depended on the
BPCA's initial financial commitment to create the enormous
site. This is often a common dilemma with major
developments as the upfront cost of land development for
such large-scale projects is often too great for any
private entity to digest. Thus, in the case of BPC, with
92-acres of new land, it was necessary for the public
sector to assume the initial risk of creating the site and
installing the infrastructure without any definite prospect
of subsequent development.
Anticipated Lead Time
In 1972, the BPCA (the Authority) issued $200 million
in tax-exempt bonds to fund landfill/foundation costs and
to provide $6 million in funds to repay the State for
advances made to the project from 1969 through 1972.[3] The
bonds were backed by the general obligation of the
Authority and a pledge of all lease payments derived from
future developers. The State's moral obligation to pay
debt service if revenues from the project were insufficient
in any one year, was also required to provide the necessary
security demanded by investors. Although the State was not
obligated to make annual budgetary appropriations for
payment on the bonds, it was explicit that such monies
would be made available if debt service could not be met
from project revenues. Additionally, to compensate for the
anticipated lack of revenues in the early years of the
project, the 1972 bonds were structured with delayed
principal payments and included a significant amount of
capitalized interest. This technique was not unusual for
municipal financings, however, it did significantly
increase the size of the issue, thereby creating a greater
future debt service burden. The first principal and
interest obligations were due in 1980, eight years after
the issuance of the bonds. Approximately $40.5 million in
capitalized interest was targeted for interest payments
until that time when, hopefully, revenues from the project
would be sufficient to meet debt service. As a final
security measure, a $14.3 million debt service reserve
account was funded from bond proceeds, enough to cover one
year of principal and interest. Additionally, it was
expected that interest earned an all unused proceeds (i.e.,
capitalized interest account, reserve fund, and
construction fund) would also be used for the payment of
interest during the initial years.[4]
With this financial structure the State had a cushion
to cover the initial development risks because the 1972
bonds could sustain an 8-to- 9 year period before
project-generating revenues were needed. Unfortunately, no
one would have ever expected that it would take more than
an entire decade to see the first dollars trickle in from
the project.
Problems With the Initial Plan
There were several inherent problems with the initial
capital structure of BPC. Much of the development was
subject to onerous and lengthy zoning regulations that only
delayed the approvals process. The longer it took to
develop the project, the more likely revenues would not be
available by 1981 to meet debt service payments on the
bonds. This fact alone increased the financial risk of the
State. Additionally, the initial plan emphasized
residential development because the project was thought to
be a natural extension of the City southward. Residential
development, however, was not viewed as a significant
revenue producer of real estate taxes, a key revenue source
of the City, while it was well known that commercial
development would produce substantial tax revenues for the
City. Thus, from a fiscal perspective, the initial
emphasis on residential uses was suspect as the best use of
the site. Finally, in the original plan no significant tax
incentives (tax abatements) were contemplated as a way to
entice private sector development on the site. The reasons
for this are unclear, however, without them the task of
drawing residential investment downtown, to Wall Street's
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well-established commercial turf, was all the more
difficult.
In retrospect, these internal flaws caused dissention
between the State and the City. The State with its
substantial financial exposure was, in effect, at the mercy
of the City's planning process. Coupled with a weak
revenue-producing plan and the lack of any proper tax
incentives for the private sector, the difficulty of
marketing BPC to potential developers was heightened. The
State desperately needed revenues by 1980, and both the
City and State shared the potential political embarrassment
if by that time all that existed was raw land void of any
visible development. Unfortunately, this is exactly what
happened over the next ten years as the persistence of a
weak real estate market added to the mounting problems
facing the project.
Fiscal Crisis and Reformulation
The Project is Empty: From 1974 to 1979, the City and State
experienced a fiscal crisis caused by NYC's overspending
and ensuing fiscal troubles, a crisis exacerbated by a
national recession. Economic decline curtailed the demand
for housing and office space in the City while abnormally
high interest rates dashed any hopes of the private sector
obtaining reasonable financing for prospective projects.
As a result, no private development broke ground between
1969 and 1980. The landfill site, completed in 1976,
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remained vacant and prospects for future revenues were
bleak.
In 1976, with, the financial problems of the State
becoming more apparent, a thrashing audit conducted by
State Comptroller Arthur Levitt combined with the recent
1975 default of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC)'s
bond anticipation notes, led to the enactment of a
statutory cap on all state agency borrowing. The capping
legislation limited BPCA borrowing to the $200 million
already issued for site preparation, and $85 million for
construction of housing on the project area (this
constituted part of a $400 million housing mortgage bond
authorization that was passed in 1973 to allow the BPCA to
fund the development of middle income housing without
dependence on other state agencies).[5] This action
officially ended future State commitments to the project in
the form of moral obligation bonds as future bonding
capacity of the BPCA with any form of general obligation
ceased. The future of the project looked hopeless, and the
1972 bonds appeared headed for default.
"Moral" Obligation Bonds In Danger: By the late 1970s, as
the first principal repayment on the 1972 bonds neared, it
became evident that no income would be forthcoming to meet
the $14.3 million annual debt service requirement. Default
seemed likely as potential developments under
consideration, such as the proposed American Stock Exchange
building, could not generate sufficient revenues in a
timely fashion. Additionally, negotiations with the
Housing of Urban Development (HUD) to provide insurance for
bond financing of the first proposed residential phase,
Gateway Plaza, were faltering which further contributed to
the reality that revenues were nonexistent.
The 1972 bonds were thought to have been structured in
a manner that provided ample time for the project to
generate sufficient revenues to support the financing.
However, by the year 1980, capitalized interest and
earnings on unused proceeds would dry up. Since principal
repayment was not permissible from bond proceeds, only the
use of a one-year reserve fund could delay default on the
bonds and then, only for one year.
By late 1979, the bonds were trading at a significant
discount due to the lack of project revenues. The default
problems of the State's UDC diminished the value of the
State's credit as its own financial solvency became a
serious issue.[6] Investor confidence was shattered, and
any realistic hopes of saving the project required major
restructuring. Significant decisions had to be made by the
State Legislature as to whether monies should be
appropriated for debt service or whether officials should
allow the bonds to go into default. As no solid
partnerships with the private sector had evolved to date,
the likelihood of the State having to support the bonds
over a several-year period was a likely scenario. A
bailout plan was needed since the project was in imminent
financial danger!
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Restructuring and Work-Out Plan Adopted: According to the
BPCA's own annual report, the future "...seemed hopeless in
1979, eleven years after the BPCA's creation." The 1980
report further stated, "There seemed little likelihood that
an eventual default on the bonds could be avoided, and many
felt the BPCA could not survive."[7] This dismal outlook
forced all parties involved with the project to devise an
alternate strategy.
The resulting reformulation of the capital structure
changed the form of the public/public partnership and
redefined the uses of the project. In November of 1979,
the Governor of New York, the Mayor of the City, and the
Executive Director of the BPCA entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (M.O.U.) which incorporated revised design,
financial, and legal principles the new partnership would
follow. These changes were to be the pivotal point in the
history of the capital structure as ownership of the site
was transferred to the State through the auspices of the
soon to be revived UDC.
The M.O.U. provided the framework for the 1979
Settlement Agreement (the Agreement) which defined
relations between the City and the UDC. The main
initiatives of the Agreement allowed the UDC to acquire fee
interest in the entire site from the City through a
condemnation proceeding, and then to convey the site to its
wholly owned subsidiary the Battery Park Development
Corporation (BPCDC).[8] In 1982, BPCDC conveyed its fee
interest in the site to the BPCA for a nominal
consideration, and BPCA became both the landlord and tenant
of the property. In contemplation of the BPCA paying
itself twice for revenues received, the Agreement
stipulated that after the payment of debt service on the
1972 bonds, any revenues available would be split between
the BPCA and the City. These amounts are analyzed in
detail in Chapter 3. Finally, the Agreement gave the City
the right to reacquire the site in year 2000, subject to
payment of all outstanding BPCA debt.
Although the M.O.U. and Agreement provided a new legal
foundation for the capital structure, the project was still
financially paralyzed. The State was now primarily
responsible for the development of the site as it owned the
property, however, the question of repaying the bonds
without any revenues still loomed. Realistically, the
State had to commit to substantial monetary expenditures
because a default on BPC bonds would impair its own future
credit worthiness. Thus in late 1979, as part of the
reformulation, the State appropriated approximately $8
million to fulfill its moral obligation on the bonds. This
public demonstration of financial support bolstered
investor confidence and prevented a default scenario.
The financial bailout plan called for state
appropriations to continue as long as revenues were
insufficient to meet debt service. At one time it was
anticipated that state appropriations would reach $60
million over a five-year time period, however, once
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revenues from the project reached a certain level, the BPCA
was obligated to repay the State for any advances made,
plus accrued interest. Reimbursement of these funds was
accomplished in 1986 when the BPCA repaid the State
$49,171,500 for principal amounts advanced from 1980
through 1986, plus an additional $19,901,500 in compounded
monthly interest.
Two final changes occurred in 1979. First, the Master
Plan was revised, and second, the City's incentive package
was enhanced to include generous tax abatements. Unlike
the first master plan, the 1979 Master Plan emphasized
commercial development by reorganizing land uses and
relocating the commercial zone from the southern tip of the
site to the area directly across from the World Trade
Center. Officials finally realized the importance
commercial development brought to the project, in terms of
revenues - - at this point, a primary objective.
Benefits of the New Capital Structure
The immediate benefits of the new restructuring plan
were numerous. Most significantly the 1972 bonds did not
go into default. Additionally, the Agreement stipulated
that neither UDC nor BPCA was required to comply with the
City's zoning resolution if certain requirements were met.
This provision greatly reduced the cumbersome approvals
process that hampered previous development efforts. The
emphasis of commercial development assured significant
revenue streams in the future as tenant payments to the
City on the commercial parcels would be significant. In
particular, the largest dollars would come from payments in
lieu of taxes (PILOT)(negotiated with the City) as the BPCA
and the project area are exempt from all real estate taxes.
The newly offered tax abatements would provide the
necessary incentives to draw private developers to the
site. Finally, the reformulation was done in a timely
fashion that not only persuaded investors to give the
project a second chance but also coincided with an
improving local real estate economy.
A New Era Of Financial Health (the 1980)
Suggestions of Prosperity: Beginning in 1980 the real
estate market and financial woes of the City turned around
and as these external factors began to improve, so did the
development progress of the project. With the BPCA at the
helm, several key events occurred that shaped the future
development of the project. In 1980, HUD agreed to insure
approximately $193 million in housing revenue bonds
allowing the developers of Gateway Plaza to begin phase 1
construction of the 1,712-unit project. This was BPC's
first development. Soon to follow would be the BPCA's
conditional approval of the developer for the commercial
buildings, Canadian-based Olympia & York (O&Y). The
selection of O&Y in 1980, and subsequent signing in 1981 of
a master ground lease between the BPCA and O&Y, signified
the first bonafide public/private partnership agreement for
commercial development on the site. It was the key turning
point in the road to success for the BPC project.
In this public/private partnership the BPCA provided
the land, through a sublease arrangement, and paid for
infrastructure improvements, while O&Y financed and
constructed four buildings making up the World Financial
Center (WFC). This commercial complex was to be started in
1981 and completed in 1985 (in May 1981 this completion
date was revised in O&Y's specific design plans to
1987).[9] O&Y would benefit from the City's tax abatements
on the commercial parcels for the first ten years of
occupancy. Although these incentives were attractive, O&Y
as master developer for all the commercial parcels, was
still exposed to significant risks by undertaking such a
financially massive project within a tight six-year time
table for completion. Any delays in construction or
significant unforeseen cost increases would mean millions
in additional interest expense for O&Y. Financing the
estimated $1.5 billion development costs of the WFC
required ingenuity and unusually strong financial resources
from the private sector partner. The O&Y financial plan
for the WFC incorporated pioneering schemes such as real
estate's entry into the commercial paper market, and real
estate loans that, at the time, represented the largest
single mortgage transactions in American lending history.
The financing strategy also had to be flexible, given the
phased nature of the project and the signed lease
commitments that had been made with the BPCA and principal
tenants. Over time, O&Y was able to achieve all these
financing objectives primarily because preleasing
commitments, which amounted to an amazing 93% of the 6
million square feet of office space, were established long
before the first tenants occupied space in mid-1985.[10]
With long-term PILOT payments assured under the master
lease arrangement, the BPCA, on the other hand, finally
turned the corner towards financial success. These
payments would commence as soon as the buildings received
their certificate of occupancy (1985 at the earliest) and
would escalate annually as the tax abatements decreased
over the first ten years of occupancy. Additionally,
immediate revenues would be realized by the BPCA as base
rents were to be paid starting in 1981 at $2 million, and
increasing annually to $17 million by year 2000.[11]
In 1981, construction on the WFC began and the BPCA
designated six development teams for a second residential
phase of the project (Rector Place). As growing revenue
projections took on greater reality, many municipal experts
began to rethink their opinion of the credit on the 1972
bonds. One of the early supporters was municipal bond
analyst Peter Fugiel of John Nuveen & Co. Incorporated, a
well-known municipal bond firm headquartered in Chicago.
As early as 1982, he reported to investors that, "... the
1972 Bonds should be viewed as investment grade paper once
again, equivalent to a single A rating."[12] He recognized
the value the O&Y lease represented as the Canadian based
firm was a solid credit-worthy developer whose binding
lease obligation with the BPCA assured a revenue stream
well into the future. "By the early 1990s", he wrote,
"...it appeared sufficient revenues would be available to
meet debt service on the 1972 bonds with very substantial
revenues (more than four times debt service coverage)
anticipated for 1997. With the State of New York
demonstrating its ongoing support of the project, the 1972
bonds may even warrant a higher rating in the future."
Fugiel was absolutely correct in his evaluation that
the BPC was about to undergo a financial transformation.
In hindsight, however, he did underestimate the quickness
with which the success would come. In 1984, the first two
buildings in the WFC complex were being topped off with
occupancy scheduled to commence the following mid-year.
Revenues began pouring into the BPCA in the form of lease
payments (primarily PILOT payments). As early as August
1986, the BPCA was financially postured to pay debt service
on the 1972 bonds from generated revenues, repay the State
for advances made, and raise funds for the additional
infrastructure needs of the project. At this point, it
appeared that the BPC had left the financial morass of the
1970s and entered a new phase of success.
Leveraging Lease Revenues
In 1986, the sufficiency of projected lease revenues
allowed the BPCA to issue $184,850,000 in Special
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Obligation Bonds which were used to repay State advances
made from 1980 through 1986 ($69,073,000) and to fund
infrastructure improvements (approximately $53,520,000).
Security for the bonds consisted of revenues from a
specially targeted set of leases, the Existing Sublease
Excess Revenues (Excess Revenues). These revenues, derived
from those commercial and residential subleases signed with
the BPCA prior to 1986, were the funds available after
payment of debt service on the 1972 bonds and all operating
and maintenance costs of the BPCA. Reference to Chart 2.1
demonstrates the financial priority of these funds. On the
strength of these Excess Revenues, BPCA obtained municipal
bond insurance (as additional security) which provided
investors with a triple-A security and lowered the overall
cost of interest on the bonds by at least 50 basis
points.[13]
The 1986 Special Obligation Bonds had particular
significance. This issue clearly indicated that the
project had reached a self-sufficient state where revenues
could support BPCA's capital needs without external
financial help. In particular, the State no longer had to
make the painful appropriations to meet their moral
obligation on the 1972 bonds, and commercial development
had reached a level that provided revenues sufficient to
repay the State and fulfill certain infrastructure
obligations.
Spreading The Wealth
Utilization of "Money Machine" for NonBPC Uses: In 1986 the
New York State Legislature passed the New York Housing
Program, a ten-year $1 billion initiative for low-and
moderate-income housing in the City of New York. Through
amendments to the M.O.U. and 1979 Settlement Agreement,
BPCA dedicated any available revenue streams from the
project to support up to $400 million net proceeds amount
for the housing program. The Housing New York Corporation
(HNYC) was created to issue debt to fund the initial $400
million phase as soon as revenues from the BPC project were
sufficient to meet debt service on any HNYC debt. Through
a series of complex public/public arrangements between the
State, the City, and the BPCA, an innovative twist to the
capital structure was shaped that allowed surplus revenues
from the project to fund other nonBPC uses.
As before, all revenues were first directed to pay the
1972 bond obligations and operating and maintenance cost of
the project. Then any remaining lease revenues were
ingeniously deposited into an Excess Revenue Fund (ERF) to
be used for leveraging purposes. In terms of priority, the
funds were first to be used to simultaneously repay the
State for advances made and any infrastructure needs of the
project (this was accomplished by the 1986 Special
Obligation bond issue). Second, remaining ERF monies were
used as security to fund the $400 million Housing New York
Program through the issuance of debt by HNYC. If ERF monies
still remained, a disbursement of the funds would be
divided 80%/20% between the City and the BPCA respectively
with uses of BPCA's share to be jointly decided (Joint
Purpose Monies). This is described in detail in Chapter 3.
In 1987, the HNYC issued $209,995,000 in tax-exempt
bonds, the first housing funds to be used for the
rehabilitation of approximately 1,800 residential units in
Manhattan (Harlem) ,and the Bronx. Revenues from the BPC
project in the ERF provided the primary source of security,
and, again, municipal bond insurance was obtained for
certain term maturities to further enhance the credit.
This bond issue marked the first funds that were used for
nonBPC uses - - a historic beginning to the new era of
public development wealth created by the BPC project.
The general strength of the Manhattan real estate
market during much of the 1980s coinciding with the
scheduled occupancy of the WFC (WFC 1 and 3 in 1985; WFC 4
in 1986; WFC 2 in 1987/88), brought new meaning to the term
"revenues". Significant surpluses were realized by the
BPCA as PILOT payments began flowing because tax
assessments on the WFC buildings were rising in line with
the City's booming real estate market. In 1989 and 1990
several additional amendments to existing public/public
agreements maximized the use of these surplus revenues to
support additional nonBPC uses. First in 1989 the City and
BPCA amended the Settlement Agreement in a way that
increased the BPCA's role in the New York Housing Program.
With revenues continually increasing, the Authority
anticipated surplus revenues could fund the additional $600
million balance of the $1 billion housing initiative.
After negotiations, the BPCA agreed to pay scheduled and
defined cash installments to the City from Excess Revenues,
(that is, after debt service on all BPCA and HNYC bonds
outstanding were met). This commitment would commence in
1994 and end when the $600 million obligation had been met.
Second, in 1990, the BPCA issued $222,660,000 in
Revenue Bonds for the sole purpose of providing funds to
the City, a net amount of $150 million - - for budget
relief. Excess Revenues sufficient to pay annual debt
service on the 1990 bonds were pledged to the bondholders.
The bond issue is subordinate to all other debt outstanding
and does not have a lien on the Excess Revenues of the
project. Only those amounts that are pledged to pay debt
service on the bonds provide the security to bondholder.
Remarkably, both rating agencies found the revenue stream
of the project sufficient to grant an A/A- rating on the
bonds. This recent example of leveraging monies for nonBPC
uses accomplished several objectives. For the State, it
alleviated the need to make politically difficult
appropriations that would offer the City relief from its
current financial problems. State monies that would have
been used for budget relief where now freed for other State
initiatives. Additionally, the bond issue set a precedent
for additional subordinate debt to be issued in the future
after all the prior obligations of BPCA and HNYC have been
met.
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It is painfully clear that the first ten years of the
project were trying and difficult times for the BPCA, the
City and the State. The turning point in the history of
the project was in 1979 with the legal and financial
restructuring of BPC and the redesign of the project's
master plan. Commercial development became the priority
and the City relinquished its ownership of the land to the
State after proving its inability to develop the property
in a timely fashion. The commitment from O&Y in 1980/81 to
build the WFC complex brought a financially strong private
sector partner to the project who constructed world famous
buildings, on schedule with "quality" becoming their
trademark. The core source of revenues to the BPCA, the
City, and the State were now in place and realized surplus
revenues would provide the nucleus for funding substantial
other nonBPC public sector objectives.
With this overview of the capital formation of BPC, it
is time to analyze the monetary viability of the project.
A close look at the inner workings of the structure and the
sensitivity of the revenue stream to fluctuating economic
conditions will help ascertain what the future holds for
the public entities involved in the project. Is the
current success a phase that will soon pass with the
growing economic difficulties of the City, or has the
project, in its current form, reached a perpetual state of
revenue self-sufficiency?
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF BPCA (1968-1990) CHART 2.1
1987 1989
- HNYC issues debt -1989 A&C Signed
Financings
Purpose
Revenue Source
2 Excess Revenues -After
- - Pint. of 1972 MOB's
- Pre 1986 Subleases
Source: Tom Oppenheim
MIT Center For Real Estate Development
ime Line 1968
-BPCA Created
1972
-BPCA Issues
"Moral" Obligation
bonds for landfill
("MOBS")
1969
-NYC entered into
99-year ground
lease w/BPCA
- 1969 Master
Plan Adopted
-No Tax
Incentives Offered
1976
-City Enters
Financial Crisis
-Gov. Carey Limits
Borrowing
-Landfill Completed
- No development
1980
-HUD Insures Gate-
way Plaza
-&Y Selected
1979
-Concern re: Pmt.
of MOB's
-1979 Settlement
Agreement
- State
Appropriates
monies for MOB's
-State Acquires
Fee Interest in
Property
1979 (cont)
-City has Right to
Reacquire Land in
2000
-Master Plan
Revised (Emphasize
Commercial)
-Tax Incentives
Offered
1983
-Severance Leases
signed
1981
- Master Ground
lease signed for
Commercial Parcels
-WFC Constr. Begins
-Residential Phase Il
Developers Selected
1985
-WFC 1&2
Occupancy
1986
-Ammendment to
1979 Settlement
Agreement
- 1986 Special
Obligation Bonds
Issued
- Housing New York
Program Passed
12/31/99
City has right to
reaquire Project
Site
1990
-Ammendment
to settlement
agreement
- 1990 Budget
Relief Bonds
issued
CHART 2.1CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF BPCA (1968-1990)
CHAPTER THREE
LEVERAGING THE BENEFITS OF PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
Today, Battery Park City is a tremendously successful
financial project with surplus revenues continually
increasing every year. Although it has been an arduous
struggle to reach this current financial bliss, it can
safely be said that the BPC project is a "money machine"
with abundant surplus monies going to fund other essential
needs of the City and State. Will this "money machine"
continue to produce excess dollars in the future and what
extent will be the magnitude of these monies? Should
public officials continue their celebration, or be worried
that future economic cycles could significantly reduce the
monetary benefits of the "money machine"? How will the
specific policy objectives established by the public sector
be funded? What, if any, are the impacts a decrease in
revenues might have on these commitments?
To answer these questions, this chapter analyzes the
potential leverage capacity of the BPCA over a thirty-year
period given various economic scenarios affecting the
revenue stream of the project. The projected leverage
capacity accounts for the existing financial obligations of
the BPCA and the funding patterns the public sector has
earmarked for surplus monies. These commitments include
the initial $400-million housing program, additional
infrastructure needs of the project, and the recent cash
obligation of the BPCA to fund the final $600 million phase
of the housing initiative. Given significant, primarily
nonBPC, program objectives and the sensitivity of existing
sublease payments to New York tax policy and the economy,
the results of the analysis should reveal what monetary
benefits the public sector can expect in the future.
In an attempt to accurately predict the future funding
resources, the analysis will subject the revenue stream to
stress tests that simulate varying economic conditions and
City tax policy affecting commercial real estate. The
PILOT payments will be the primary focus as these amounts
represent approximately 75% to 80% of the existing sublease
revenues.[1] Realistic forecasts of projected revenues
under No-Growth and Decline scenarios will be analyzed and
compared to BPCA's current assumption that PILOT payments
will continue to grow at 4.5% per year.
Since PILOT payments are based on the tax assessment
of the value of the land and building, current City tax
policy is important to this analysis. This is particularly
true in light of the recent downward revisions to BPCA's
total revenue projections. Because each sublease tenant
has the right to appeal the tax estimate for each parcel,
rollbacks on tax assessments can occur annually. If the
New York State court(s) decide favorably, taxes are revised
to reflect the settled amount. In the above-mentioned
case, Merrill Lynch contended that assessments had been
made on the basis of optimistic income statements. As a
result of their successful argument, assessments on WFC
building 2 and 4 were rolled back .4% for the 1990-91
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fiscal year. Evidently, the assessment did not account for
the impact a large block of unused and vacant space had on
Merrill's income stream. These adjustments reduced the
revenue stream in fiscal year 1990-91 by approximately $1
million but did not adversely affect the financial
integrity of the BPCA or the credit rating of the BPCA's
outstanding obligations. Adjustments to PILOT payments,
however, do present a risk. If future bond issues of the
Authority go to market during periods when there is a drop
in assessments, the rating and interest rates on these debt
obligations could reflect the magnitude of the reduced
PILOT payments. This would increase the cost to BPCA of
borrowing funds and potentially affect the marketability of
future financings.
Finally, the analysis estimates the amount of annual
discretionary monies the BPCA and City can expect to have
available for specified purposes, given a maximum leverage
scenario. "Discretionary Amounts" are defined, in terms of
existing financial obligations, as those annual amounts
that are available to the City and BPCA after the payment
of operating and maintenance costs, debt service on all
bonds outstanding secured by existing sublease revenues,
and required obligations pursuant to the 1979 Settlement
Agreement. As the analysis illustrates, these amounts are
a significant direct source of cash to the City and BPCA.
From Lease Revenues to Bonded Debt to City Coffers
The BPC Flow of Funds: A financial "model of simulation"
has been created that accurately represents the current
capital structure of Battery Park City. It has been
designed to track the flow of funds resulting from all the
legal requirements of outstanding BPCA and HNYC bonds and
the various agreements between the BPCA and City that have
evolved over the past several years. Flexibility of the
model allows PILOT payments to be adjusted upward or
downward in ten-year increments to determine how changing
economic conditions or tax policy would affect bond
leverage capacity and discretionary amounts available for
other nonBPC uses.
It is important to understand the intricacies and inner
workings of the current capital structure in order to
effectively interpret the following analyses. Existing
sublease revenues are derived primarily from PILOT payments
made on the commercial (World Financial Centers) parcels.
As mentioned, PILOT amounts represent approximately 75%-80%
of the total existing sublease revenues with the remaining
commercial revenues being derived from base rent, retail
rent and other rent (approximately 10% of total commercial
payments). Combined lease payments on the Gateway Plaza
and the Rector Place residential phases supply the balance
of total existing sublease revenues and approximate 15% of
total revenues. Thus the breakdown of existing sublease
revenues is derived from 85% commercial lease payments and
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15% residential. Annually, these total existing sublease
revenues flow through a complex maze of requirements which
the capital structure automatically directs for certain
predetermined uses. When revenues increase or decrease, so
does the direction of these monies within the capital
structure to assure all outstanding obligations and program
objectives are met in order of their priority. By way of
analogy, visualize an armored car filled with money that
annually journeys down a straight road with numerous
unloading stops along the way toward its final destination.
This route remains exact and predictable as long as all
BPCA and HNYC bonds subject to existing sublease revenues
remain outstanding. To help in the understanding of this
flow of funds, a route map the armored car takes each year
is provided on the following page.
The first unloading point, or more accurately stated
the first priority of monies, is to pay debt service on the
1972 moral obligation bonds pursuant to the 1972 General
Bond Resolution.[2] Currently this amount averages
approximately $14.3 million annually. After this payment,
funds go to pay the BPCA's operating/maintenance and
administrative expenses. In 1990, budgeted amounts for
these costs are $13.9 million, an accurate figure as the
BPCA has never exceeded their budgeted amount.
All remaining revenues then flow to the City Rent
Fund, established by the 1972 General Bond Resolution, for
disbursement to both the City and the BPCA. The split of
funds to each public entity is subject to calculations
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FLOW OF FUNDS CHART 3.1
Other
Revenues from
Subleases
Commencing
After 1/86
-F
Settlement
Agreement
Extra ERF Indebtedness
Residual Excess Revenue
From Subleases
Commencing Before 1/86
Sourc:e: Tom Oppenheim
MIT Center For Real Estate Development
CHART 3.1FLOW OF FUNDS
agreed upon in the 1986 Amended Settlement Agreement. It
is derived by taking the amounts in the City Rent Fund and
allocating them into PILOTs and Other Payments based upon
the proportion of PILOTs to Other Payments. The amounts
representing the PILOT proportion are remitted to the City
and the balance, commonly referred to as Joint Purpose
Monies, goes to the BPCA for uses that are jointly decided
upon by the Mayor, City Comptroller, and the BPCA. Since
the amount of PILOT payments remitted to the City
approximates 75% to 80% of the revenues annually, for
simplicity the disbursement of all remaining monies is
often referred to as the "80%/20%" split.
There is one important caveat to this distribution
pattern. In contemplation of the issuance of additional
debt, the 1986 Amendment to the Settlement Agreement
isolates any revenues derived from existing subleases
(those leases signed prior to 1986) and protects them from
the initial 80%/20% split mentioned above. Only "Other
Revenues" (that is any new leases signed post 1986, lump
sum payments , transaction payments, and any future
revenues realized from new leases) are subject to the
80%/20% split at the City Rent Fund level after certain
obligations under the 1989 Agreement and Consent (A&C) are
met. This will be discussed in detail later. At this
point, the journey for Other Revenues ends, however, the
existing sublease revenues are loaded back into the armored
car for a complex series of stops.
The 1986 Amendment to the Settlement Agreement
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stipulates that all existing sublease revenues are to be
used for the payment of all "Prior Claims and Agreed Upon
Commitments," before they are subject to the 80%/20% split.
These claims include the payment of all BPCA bond
obligations being used to repay $69 million in state
advances, to finance $53 million in infrastructure costs,
and to secure up to $400 million (net principal amount) of
HNYC bonds issued pursuant to the Housing New York Program.
These obligations constitute Excess Revenue Fund (ERF)
indebtedness, and follow the path of our travels to the
next unloading point - - the Excess Revenue Fund (the ERF).
Once there, these monies are used to pay debt service on
all ERF indebtedness in the following order of priority:
(i) The 1986 Special Obligation Bonds ($184.8 million),
(ii) the 1987 HNYC Revenue Bonds ($209.9 million), and
(iii) any additional HNYC bonds or ERF indebtedness that
are issued within the limits of the ERF additional bond
test, Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA)
requirements, and, as we will shortly see, the 1990
Resolution.
In 1990, through an amendment to the 1986 Amended
Settlement Agreement, the definition of "Prior Claims" was
expanded to include the 1990 Budget Relief Bonds. The
amendment directs revenues to pay debt service on the 1990
bonds (Pledged Revenues) from available ERF funds after the
1986 Special Obligation and 1987 HNYC (Priority
Obligations) bond payments are met. It is important to
understand that, unlike the 1986 BPCA bonds and the 1987
HNYC issue, the 1990 bonds do not have a lien on the ERF
and are subordinate debt secured solely by Pledged
Revenues. Any dramatic fluctuations to the ERF fund
balance could possibly affect the ability to meet debt
service on the 1990 bonds as these funds are directed first
to Priority obligations. Thus, in order to provide
assurances to investors, the 1990 Resolution sets forth
certain revenue tests that must be met before any future
HNYC or other ERF indebtedness is issued. Additionally, a
Special Fund was established that requires $51 million of
Excess Revenues to be deposited over a three-year period
for payment of debt service, on these 1990 bonds, if
necessary. Annual debt service on the 1990 bonds is $16
million from 1993 to 1997, and escalates to $19.7 million
in 1998 when the first principal payments are due.
At this juncture, the balance of Excess Revenues are
stuffed back into the armored car and drives to their last
stop before their final destination. The Excess Revenues
are reunited with the Other Revenues where they must
fulfill the requirements of the 1989 A&C. The A&C
stipulates that all revenues (both Excess and Other
Revenues) are to be paid to the City in annual cash
installments for the benefit of a new $600 million housing
initiative. These payments, specified in the A&C, commence
in 1994 and increase annually until the program has been
fully funded. Total cash installments will fund the entire
$600 million program, with payments starting as low as
$13.2 million in 1994, increasing to a maximum of $79.2
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million in 1999.
After annual cash payments have been made under the
1989 A&C, all remaining monies become "Discretionary
Amounts" subject to the 80%/20% split. In essence,
remaining PILOT payments are remitted to the City and the
balance remain with the BPCA as Joint Purpose Monies. As
can be imagined, the use of the Joint Purpose Monies is the
cause for many lengthy and heated negotiations between the
Mayor's office, City Comptroller and BPCA.
This ends the complicated travels of the Excess
Revenues and Other Revenue sources of the BPC project. It
should be noted that any future borrowing, such as any debt
issued for purposes other than infrastructure costs of the
project or to fulfill the $400-million housing program,
would not constitute additional ERF indebtedness. This new
debt would thus be further subordinate to all issues
outstanding, including the 1990 Budget Relief bonds.
Additionally, since the new debt would be secured solely by
any Excess Revenues (before they become Discretionary
Amounts), issuance would require the mutual agreement of
the Mayor, City Comptroller, BPCA, and the State. Now that
the flow of funds, which the financial model simulates, is
understood it is time to examine the analysis.
Modelling The flow Of Funds
General Assumptions: This analysis considers only Excess
Revenues generated from Existing Subleases. These monies
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represent the majority of total annual projected funds and
are easily quantifiable because the amount of contractual
obligations that represent signed leases (prior to 1986) do
not vary. Monies from Other Revenues, however, are not
closely examined because these funds to date represent more
recent residential subleases (post 1986) whose revenues
depend, among other things, fluctuating transaction
payments (those monies derived from closing costs on the
individual sale of apartment units). Additionally, Other
Revenues can increase with the signing of future leases - -
these, of course, are not predictable. Thus, projections
of these amounts would be purely speculative and extremely
difficult. As derived from the 1990 revised Cushman and
Wakefield Pro Forma Cash Flow Study, Excess Revenue
projections constitute: (i) master lease payments, from
commercial tenants of the World Financial Center's four
towers, in the form of PILOTs, and Other Rent (base rent,
percentage rent, retail rent, and storage/other rent), and
(ii) sublease payments for two residential projects, the
Gateway Plaza and Rector Place.
The model incorporates all outflows of money for
existing debt service payments, the 1989 A&C obligations,
and other BPCA required expenditures. In addition, debt
service on $56 million planned future financings (net
proceeds) for BPC's final infrastructure costs and $257.4
million (net proceeds) in final fund obligations to the
$400-million housing program have been included in the
model. According to the BPCA, these will be issued over
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the next three years.[3] The amounts available after these
obligations are fulfilled are integral; they represent the
remaining leverage potential of the BPCA's current revenue
stream. These monies, after passing the additional bond
test of the ERF indebtedness and 1990 Bond Resolution, MBIA
insurance requirements, and other bond covenants, are what
will be available to secure additional subordinate debt
and/or provide discretionary amounts to the City and the
BPCA.
I have assumed that the specific obligations under the
1989 A&C will be met in each year with any shortfalls being
funded from Other Revenue sources. Preliminary BPCA
projections of these more variable revenues indicate that
sufficient funds will be available to fulfill the housing
obligations in each year under the 1989 A&C. All future
leveraged amounts are assumed to mature in thirty-years and
carry a tax-exempt rate of 8.00%, a figure which is
consistent with today's interest rates. Following the
pattern of existing indebtedness, interest is capitalized
for three full years with the first debt service payments
commencing in the fourth year the bonds remain
outstanding.[4] All existing and future reserve funds
assume earnings at an interest rate of 5.00%, the actual
rate used by the BPCA and its financial advisors for their
projections. operating/maintenance and administrative
expenses of BPCA grow annually at 5%, and finally, all new
leveraged amounts must meet an onerous 2-times debt
coverage ratio. This very high standard has been an
attempt to insure a credit rating of A- or better even in
the event potential credit analysis by the rating agencies
becomes more stringent in the future. This assumption,
however, is extremely conservative, especially in light of
the fact that the 1990 bonds received an A/A- rating from
Moody's and Standard and Poor's under a 1.25 times coverage
ratio.[5]
Following Cushman and Wakefield's assumption, which is
based on an historical analysis of New York tax policy, the
Base-Case financial analysis incorporates a 4.5% annual
growth rate in PILOT payments. This study, covering a
20-year period from 1970 through 1989, concludes that
either or both the assessment on the value of the
land/building and the actual tax rate for commercial
properties has increased on average 4% to 5% per year. In
fact, at no time over the past two decades has the total
taxes collected by the City declined in any year. For
example, the 1970s were a period of serious city-wide
recession, sluggish or declining real estate values, high
office vacancies and foreclosures. This unfavorable
climate for commercial real estate, however, did not
negatively affect taxes as commercial real estate
assessments rose 1.96% on an annually compounded basis
while the tax rate grew at 6.08% on the same basis. Given
this evidence, a PILOT growth rate of 4.5% is consistent
with historical tax policy in New York.
PILOT payments do not reach full value until 1999
because specially negotiated tax abatements remain in
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effect for the first ten years of each commercial parcel's
sublease. The abatements include a 75% exemption for the
first 2 million square feet of space which drops 7.5% per
year until the eleventh year, and a 50% exemption on the
remaining 4 million square footage which drops 5% per year
until the eleventh year. For example, in 1989/90
land/building assessment for the 1,156,000 square foot WFC
1 was $164 million and the tax rate was $9.53 per $100 of
assessment.[6] Therefore the full value of the PILOT
payment owed to the BPCA was $15.6 million. However, with
the tax abatement in place, the bill is only $3.9 million
in the initial year. The following year, if the assessed
values and tax rates remain constant, the amount due is
$5.1 million because only 67.5% of the assessed value is
exempt. This PILOT payment escalation continues until the
eleventh year when the full $15.6 million would be owed.
Results: A financial summary of the Base-Case analysis can
be found on the following page with complete financials
presented in Appendix A. The summary sheet highlights the
flow of Existing Sublease Revenues and identifies the
prioritized uses of these monies as reflected in BPC's
current structure. The analysis provides aggregate figures
for the entire thirty-year period plus a breakdown of the
amounts in ten-year intervals to gain a better
understanding of how and when the revenues are realized and
expended. The summary sheet is designed to illustrate how
much Excess Revenues are available for future unplanned
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Figure 3.2
Sumnnary of Base Case Scenario - - BPCA Flow of Funds Model
Total Years Years Years
(1990-2020) (1990-2000) (2001-2010) (2011-2020)
BREAKDOWN OF COMPONENTS (Millions) (Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revenues From Existing Subleases.... $6,643.4 $1 315.4 $2 182.2 $3 145.7
Current Debt Service Obligations........ (1 906.7) (636.9) t709.6) 560.3)
O&M/Adm. Costs...................... 1983.6) (197.5) (299.0) (487.1)
Reserve Fund Interest............... 68.7 25.0 25.6 18.1
------------------ -------------------- 
----------- -----------
Excess Revenue Fund (ERF) Amounts(1).... 3,821.8 506.0 1 199.3 2 116.5
Planned Financings Debt Service...... (1,157.9) (274.5) t441.7) (441.7)
-------------------- 
---------- -------------------------------------
Net Excess Applied to Settlement
Agreement..................................2,663.9 231.5 757.6 1,674.8
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM (@600 Million)
------------------------------------------------
Excess Revenues Applied (2)............. 233.1 113.8 119.3 0.0
City Split Amounts (3).................. 66.7 66.7 0.0 0.0
Other Revenues Needed (4)............... 300.2 242.6 57.6 0.0
Excess Rev. Available For Leverage(5)... 2,364.1 51.0 638.3 1,674.8
FUTURE UNPLANNED LEVERAGE CAPABILITY
----------~~~~~---------------------------------
Leveraged Amounts...................... 1,213.1 368.0 433.7 411.4
Net Proceed Amounts(6)................ 788.5 239.2 281.9 267.4
Debt Service On New Debt................ (1,136.1) 0.0 (298.8) (837.3)
Greatest Single Year Bonding Capacity... 368.0 368.0 60.3 131.4
()(Year) 2000 2000 2009 2013
Excess Revenues Available For Split(7).. 1,228.0 51.0 339.5 837.5
DISCRETIONARY AMOUNTS
City Split (After Housing Program) 941.6 0.0 271.6 670.0
Joint Purpose Monies (Nominal Dollars).. 286.4 51.0 67.9 167.5
FUNDING SOURCES AVAIL. AFTER HSG. (PV @ 8.00%)
Leveraged Amounts....................... 345.0 N/A N/A N/A
City Split ............................. 209.6 N/A N/A N/A
Joint urpose Monies.................... 76.3 N/A N/A N/A
---------- --------- ----------------------------------------
TOTAL ............................ 631.0
------------------~~~~------------------------------
FOOTNOTES: (Please see complete financials in Appendix A)
(1) $51 million of this amount is deposited into the Special Fund from 1990-1992 and is not
available for debt service in these years. In 1993, this amount becomes Joint Purpose Monies.
(2) Existing sublease excess revenues applied to new hsg. program prsuant to M.O.U and 1989 A & C.(3) City split amounts used to fund new hsg. program in the years 990 through 1993.
(4) These are additional revenues needed to meet the 1989 A&C hsg. obligations due to insufficient existing
sublease revenues. Their source is new leases, transaction payments, and anticipated future revenues
from new subleases signed post 1986.
(5) Represents Excess Revenues after payment to $600 million hsg. of $233.1 excess rev. plus $66.7 city split amts.
(6) Represents 65% of bond proceeds to account for cost of issuance, capitalized interest, and reserve fund amounts.
(7) Excess Revenues Available for Leveraged amouunts less new debt service on unplanned financings.
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. Center For Real Estate Development
leveraging capacity and distribution amounts after all
current debt and program obligations of the BPCA have been
fulfilled.
The enormous amount of total existing sublease
revenues realized over the next thirty years - - almost
$6.7 billion - - immediately answers the question whether
the project will make money or not. To put this amount
into perspective, it should be understood that a majority
of these monies are generated from the 6 million square
feet of the WFC complex alone! There is no telling how
much more revenues will be realized from future development
as almost half of the 92-acres are still unoccupied.
Approximately 80% of the $6.7 billion will be generated in
the last twenty years (2001-2020) of the study period when
PILOT payments no longer reflect any tax abatements.
Before funds can be made available for additional uses,
approximately $2.9 billion must be used to pay for current
debt obligations and operating costs of the project.
Remaining Excess Revenues servicing planned financings
expected to be issued in the next three years (1990 through
1993) will consume an estimated $1.2 billion over the next
thirty-years. Sufficient Excess Revenues in any year are
strong enough to support all outstanding commitments. This
is demonstrated by the large Net Excess amounts (line item
Net Excess Applied to Settlement Agreement in figure 3.2)
available in any ten-year interval, even in the weakest
time period (1990-2000) when revenues still reflect tax
abatements. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that all
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current and planned debt service payments of the BPCA and
HNYC will be easily be met for the duration they are
outstanding.
The next level of priority the public sector has
established is the new $600 million housing initiative. As
explained earlier, this commitment will be fulfilled
through annual cash payments commencing in 1994 and ending
when the program has reached the entire funding level. To
pay for this program, all available revenues are to be
immediately directed from earmarked monies over the next
thirteen years. (These funds include available Excess
Revenues, City split amounts, and Other Revenues.) The
13-year time frame represents the period that it will take
to cumulate revenues sufficient to meet the annual cash
payments specified in the 1989 A&C. These contractual
demands can be found in Appendix A in the detailed
financial worksheet on the line item "Housing Program
Payments per A&C."
The summary sheet delineates the different sources of
revenues used to meet the $600-million housing initiative.
The two largest funding sources, Excess Revenues and Other
Revenues, total $233.1 million and $300 million
respectively. By design, the first monies directed to the
program are the maximum amount of Excess Revenues available
in each year. At the outset in 1994, Excess Revenues are
insufficient to meet annual payments because existing
obligations digest most of these funds. As a result, BPCA
must compensate for deficient amounts by tapping Other
Revenue sources that become available. These amounts are
significant because they represent half of the funding
source of the total housing commitment - - and such
supplemental funds are necessary to fund the A&C targets in
each year the program is outstanding (Please see Appendix A
for annual Other Revenue amounts). The third source of
revenue is the money available to the City under the
80%/20% split provision. Since the A&C agreement first
directs all available revenues to the housing program, the
traditional split is eliminated from 1994 until the program
goal is met. Due to the delayed commencement of A&C cash
payments, however, $66.7 million City split dollars are
available in the years 1990 through 1993 to the fund the
initiative. Although there is no contractual obligation of
the City to apply these monies to the program, I have
anticipated that the City will make these funds available
as the program primarily benefits City residents and has
become a high priority within the Administration.[7]
As the model indicates, the $600-million housing
program is likely to be fully funded by the year 2003.
Since this commitment represents the last contractual
obligation the public sector has established to date for
BPCA surplus monies, revenues from this time forward can be
utilized to support leveraged amounts and provide
discretionary monies to the City and the BPCA under the
initial split arrangement. Over the subsequent twenty
years (2001-2020), the model predicts that the BPC project
will generate enough excess revenues to fund $788 million
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in net proceeds from municipal bond offerings, with the
first feasible issuance date being as early as year 2000.
How can this happen when the new housing program has
not yet been fulfilled? First, a maximum of $368 million
(par amount) of bonds can be issued in 2000 due to the fact
that three years of capitalized interest (calculated into
the size of all unplanned leveraged amounts) permits
advanced bond issuance. This means that the first debt
service payment obligation on these new bonds would be in
the year 2004, not 2000. Second, since the housing program
goal will have been met by this date, available Excess
Revenues will amount to $65 million in that year alone.
Given a conservative 2-times debt coverage ratio, the
amount of debt service these Excess Revenues can support
approximates $32.5 million (with the remaining balance of
monies going to the City and BPCA as split amounts).
Because Excess Revenues will continue to grow in the
remaining years absent large capital outlay programs, the
amount of future leveraging capability and discretionary
amounts that can be expected for other nonBPC uses is
likely to reach significant proportions.
On the following page, Graph 3.3 illustrates the
distribution of BPCA's $6.7 billion existing sublease
revenues generated during the thirty-year period of
analysis. As mentioned, total existing sublease revenues
are applied in certain order of priority which the graph
displays. Several noteworthy conclusions can be drawn.
First, revenues are sufficient to support the initial costs
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Graph 3.3-Application of Revenues
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of creating the land, infrastructure needs, and annual
operating costs of the project. This is reflected by
monies being applied first to the $1.9 billion of current
debt payments and the $983.6 million in O&M costs of the
project over the next thirty-years. Secondly, Excess
Revenues will be available to support additional projected
capital costs of the project, and additional bonds to
fulfill the initial $400-million housing commitment of the
BPCA. This is conveyed by the bar that represents planned
debt. Existing sublease revenues that remain will then be
applied to the new A&C $600-million housing initiative.
Only $300 million will be available to meet this
obligation: as $233 million Excess revenues and $66.7
million City split amounts are available during the period
between 1990 and 2003. The remaining $300 million
necessary to fulfill the program will come from Other
Revenue sources. Finally, after all these obligations are
met, beginning in 2004, Excess Revenues will be sufficient
to provide significant leveraged amounts and Discretionary
monies to the City and the BPCA. The bar labeled "Future
Debt" indicates the maximum amount of debt service Excess
Revenues can support given a 2-times debt coverage ratio.
The $1.13 billion figure is the aggregate debt service
payments on $1.2 billion par amount of bonds that can be
issued in the last 20 years of this study period. These
funds will provide significant additional resources for
other nonBPC uses. Finally, the remaining balance of
Excess Revenues in each year will result in $941.6 million
City split amounts and $286.4 million Joint Purpose Monies.
The last three bars on the graph (Future Debt, City,
and Joint Purp.) illustrate the financial prowess of the
existing sublease revenues in the future. It is obvious
that the current status of BPC's revenue stream is
sufficient to accomplish significant monetary initiatives
the City, State, and BPCA wish to focus on. The Base-Case
has assumed conservative growth rates to the revenue stream
and has imposed onerous new financial requirements such as
a 2-times debt coverage ratio. However, the New York real
estate market and economy are currently undergoing
difficult times. Thus, it is necessary to ask whether the
"money machine" can continue to meet the optimistic goals
of the public sector under difficult economic times.
Testing the Sensitivity of Revenue Flows
"No-Growth" and "Decline-Case" Assumptions: Under these
scenarios, the exact same assumptions that were used for
the Base-Case analysis apply. The only exception is
adjustments to the growth rate of the PILOT payments.
The No-Growth scenario assumes that PILOT payments do
not increase in size from the years 2000 to 2020. While
the commercial parcels are subject to partial exemption,
however, tax assessment of the land/building(s) remains at
a 3% annual growth rate and the effective tax rate
continues to increase by 1% per year. These assumptions
allow, in effect, the tax abatements to be fully utilized
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and the full value of the PILOT payments to be realized
before subjecting them to a No-Growth hypothesis.
Following Cushman and Wakefield's analysis, it is realistic
to assume the City's future tax assessments on the
commercial parcels during the first ten years of the study
period will increase. Since PILOT payments are derived by
two components, the tax assessment of the land/building and
the tax rate, the City has the ability to compensate for
any decrease in one component by increasing the other. In
fact, the Cushman and Wakefield's historical study found
such an interplay pattern between these two variables.
During the 1970s, tax rates increased dramatically, while
assessments remained fairly constant. During the 1980s,
however, assessments not tax rates have been the prime
instrument of the City's tax policy. Given this convincing
evidence combined with the specially negotiated tax
abatements already built into the commercial subleases,
allowing the PILOT payments to reach their full value seems
to be a realistic assumption, even for the No-Growth
scenario.
On the other hand, the Decline scenario adjusts PILOT
payments downward by 2.4% annually during the first ten
years, then assumes 0% growth from 2001 to 2010, and
finally resumes a reduction in PILOT payments by 2.4%
annually in the final ten years of the analysis. This
scenario seems highly unlikely given the historical tax
policy of the City and economic cycles that persist in real
estate, however, it is worth examining to see the impact
such a doomsday hypothesis would have on the BPC project
revenues.
Results: The summary sheet on the following page compares
the Base-Case findings with the results of the two
sensitivity analyses. An initial review of the figures
shows a significant reduction in the amount of leveraging
capability and discretionary amounts realized by the City
and BPCA resulting from reduced revenue projections. Most
of the generated revenues, under these scenarios, are
utilized to pay for the mandatory $400-million housing
program, plus all other prior obligations of the BPCA.
Additionally, less Excess Revenues are available for the
$600-million housing initiative and as a result, greater
dependency on Other Revenues becomes necessary. For
example, in the No-Growth scenario, $33 million in Other
Revenues is required, above what is necessary in the
Base-Case; in the Decline-Case scenario the figure is $56
million. The conclusion is clear: a reduction in PILOT
payments for any length of time shifts the burden of
funding this portion of the housing initiative to the less
uncertain and more variable revenues from Other Revenue
sources. This is risky as Other Revenue amounts, today,
represent a minor source of the total revenues available to
the BPCA.
Graph 3.5 (pg.58) illustrates how fluctuating Existing
Sublease Revenues will impact the program objectives of the
public sector. Revisions to the revenue stream in the two
sensitivity analysis still produce $4.9 billion and $4.7
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Figure 3.4
Comparison of Sensitivity Anaysis - - BPCA Flow of Funds Model
BASE CASE NO GROWTH DECLINE CASE
(4.5% increase (0% increase (2.4% decrease
2000 - 2020) 1990-2020) ten yr. cycles)
BREADOWN OF COMPONENTS (Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
Revenues From Existing Subleses.... $6,643.4 $4,950.1 $4,728.4
Current Debt Service Obligations .. (1 906.7) (1 906 7) (1 906 7)
O&M/Adm. Costs ..................... 983.6) (983.6)
Reserve Fund Interest............... 68.7 68.7 68.7
----------------------------- 
------------------- -------------------- =-----
Excess Revenue Fund (ERF) Amounts(1).... 3,821.8 2,128.6 1,906.8
Planned Financings Debt Service ..... (1,157.9) (1,157.9) (1,157.9)
----------------------- 
----------------------------- ---------------------------
Net Excess Applied to Settlement
Agreement........................... 2,663.9 970.6 748.9
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM (@600 Million)
----------------------------------------------------------
Excess Revenues Applied (2)............. 233.1 200.1 182.8
City Split Amounts (3).................. 66.7 66.7 61.1
Other Revenues Needed (4)............... 300.2 333.1 356.1
Excess Rev. Available For Leverage(5)... 2,364.1 703.8 505.0
FUTURE UNPLANNED LEVERAGE CAPABILITY
Leveraged Amounts...................... 1,213.1 200.1 43.8
Net Proceed Amounts(6)................ 788.5 130.1 28.5
Debt Service On New Debt................ (1,136.1) (277.7) (66.2)
L Greatest Single Year Bonding Capacity... 368.0 173.8 43.8
05~
Excess Revenues Available For Split(7).. 1,228.0 426.1 438.8
DISCRETIONARY AMOUNTS
City S plit (After Housing Program) 941.6 300.0 310.2
Joint Purpose Monies (Nominal Dollars).. 286.4 126.0 128.6
FUNDING SOURCES AVAIL. AFTER HSG. (PV @ 8.00%)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Leveraged Amounts....................... 345.0 79.6 18.8
City Sp lit ............................. 209.6 109.6 112.2
Joint urpose Monies.....................76.3 51.3 53.1
TOTAL............................ 631.0 240.5 184.1
FOOTNOTES:
(1) $51 million of this amount is deposited into the Special Fund from 1990-1992 and is not
available for debt service in these years. In 1993, this amount becomes Joint Purpose Monies.
(2) Existing sublease excess revenues applied to new hsg. program prsuant to M.O.U and 1989 A & C.
(3) City split amounts used to fund new nsg. program in the years 990 through 1993.
(4) These are additional revenues needed to meet the 1989 A&C hsg. obligations due to insufficient existing
sublease revenues. Their source is new leases, transaction payments, and anticipated future revenues
from new subleases signed post 1986.
(5) Represents Excess Revenues after payment to $600 million hsg. of $233.1 excess rev. plus $66.7 city split amts.
(6) Represents 65% of bond proceeds to account for cost of issuance, capitalized interest, and.reserve fund amounts.
(7) Excess Revenues Available for Leveraged amouunts less new debt service on unplanned financings.
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. Center For real Estate Development
billion in total revenues. Although this represents
approximately a $2 billion decline in total revenues,
monies over the thirty-year period are still sufficient to
meet, in a timely fashion, current debt obligations,
operating costs of the project, and planned financings that
are expected to be issued in the next three years.
Therefore, even in the Decline scenario, revenues are still
sufficient to pay for the cost of creating of the landfill,
final infrastructure, and fulfilling the City's
$400-million housing commitment. The real impact of the
downward movement in PILOT payments is on the ability of
the BPCA to fund the subsequent $600-million housing
commitment and other nonBPC uses realized under the
Base-Case.
The first impact is a question of timing. As
mentioned above, with less Excess Revenues available for
the $600-million housing obligation, there is a greater
dependency on Other Revenues. In the No-Growth scenario,
Other Revenue sources represent more than 55% of the total
cash commitment to the program, and in the Decline-Case
close to 60% of the cash payments are derived from this
revenue source. As evident in Graph 3.5, and more clearly
in Graph 3.6, monies from Excess Revenues that are applied
to the housing program are greatly diminished from that
amount available in the Base-Case. Any greater reduction
in PILOT payments could result in a delay of the housing
program being fulfilled by 2003 because the generation of
Other Revenues may not be sufficient to meet the increased
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shortfalls. Production of Other Revenues currently depends
on unpredictable transaction payments to the BPCA, and
those residential subleases (signed after 1986) which
produce little revenues relative to existing sublease
monies. To a large extent, the viability of this revenue
source in the future is dependent on the pace of new
development on the site. The signing of any new subleases
would naturally increase funds realized by the BPCA,
however, to rely on future leases to meet increasing
shortfalls caused by a severe reduction in PILOT payments
is not a fiscally prudent policy.
Second, although there is likely to be enough total
revenues to meet the $600-million housing program under
either sensitivity scenario, the leveraging capacity and
discretionary amounts available to the City and the BPCA
over the subsequent years would truly absorb the impact of
reduced revenues. Most notable is the amount of future
debt service supportable by the revenue stream in the years
2004 through 2020. In the No-Growth scenario, the amount
of leveraging capability is reduced to $200 million (in par
amount of bonds) and in the Decline-Case scenario only an
insignificant $43 million could feasibly be issued. With
less debt being issued, most of the Excess Revenues
available after 2004 are directed to the traditional
80%/20% split. Approximately $426 million in discretionary
amounts would be realized in the No-Growth scenario
compared to $438 million in the Decline-Case example.
Why are these amounts greater in the Decline-Case when
less total revenues are generated? Simply, when less debt
is issued after 2004 under the Decline-Case scenario as a
result of the revenue streams' inability to meet the
necessary 2-times debt service coverage ratio, more becomes
available for the split. On the other hand, the No-Growth
scenario can support more debt thus reducing somewhat the
amount available as discretionary funds. Overall, however,
with the ability to raise $200 million in debt, the
No-Growth scenario's total future funding resources
(leveraged amounts plus discretionary amounts) outweighs
that realized under the Decline-Case scenario by $144
million in nominal dollars.
One final observation from the sensitivity analyses.
When subjecting PILOT payments to decreasing growth rates
in the early years (Decline-Case), the ability to meet debt
service payments on the planned financings (1990 through
1993) is marginal. This is particularly so in the year
1994. To explain this phenomenon the complete financials
for the Base-Case should be examined (Appendix A). In
1994, the first debt service payments (from Excess
Revenues, not the capitalized interest account) are due on
$225 million of HNYC bonds and $38 million of BPCA bonds to
be issued in 1990 and 1991 respectively. These planned
financings are to fulfill final infrastructure needs of the
project and to meet the remaining obligation of the
$400-million housing program. The 1994 debt service
amounts on these issues equal $19.9 million and $2.98
million respectively. In this same year, the amount of
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available revenues to meet these debt service payments
approximates $25.6 million, leaving a balance of only $2.6
million in Excess Revenues available for other uses. When
PILOT payments are reduced by 2.4% annually, the amount of
available revenues to meet this debt service obligation
drops nearly $2.6 million. The necessary debt payments can
be met, but at best, it is tight. Any greater reduction in
the revenue stream could make the BPCA and HNYC bonds
issued in 1990 and 1991 vulnerable to default.
Upon further analysis, the potential default scenario
(occurring in 1994) could be somewhat mitigated by delaying
debt service payments on these two issues by capitalizing
interest for one additional year. Surprisingly, a one-year
wait allows Excess Revenues to grow to $36.9 million,
thereby providing a larger cushion to meet a new $25.5
million combined debt service obligation in that year (this
debt service amount increases by $2.5 million due to the
additional one year of capitalized interest). Instead of
only $2.6 million remaining in 1994, approximately $25.6
million would be available (due to no debt service on
planned financings in that year) plus almost $11.5 million
in 1995 after the payment of the delayed debt service.
Thus a one-year wait in large debt amounts would give
sufficient time for the revenue stream to grow to a level
that could withstand large negative swings in PILOT growth
rates.
Despite potential aberrations in PILOT payments, the
presented analyses illustrates that the BPCA, the City, and
the State can look forward to the continuation of a
financially successful project. Although a No-Growth
scenario and a Decline-Case analysis demonstrate the
sobering effect of a reduction in the revenue stream on the
monetary benefits of the project, it is unlikely that these
scenarios will ever come to fruition. Neither PILOT
payments nor tax policy in New York can remain in a
No-Growth or negative posture for very long. The City
controls tax policy by either raising tax rates or
assessments, and this fact alone acts as a partial internal
hedge against real estate downturns. It therefore can
realistically be envisioned that not only will the $1
billion housing initiative be met by the year 2003, but
that future revenues will support an additional $788
million in net proceeds to be used for other nonhousing
purposes. Furthermore, discretionary amounts to the City
and BPCA will exceed $1.2 billion over thirty-years. These
total benefits, present valued at 8.00%, equate to a
staggering $631 million. An amount the public sector can
expect with reasonable certainty and unquestionable
enthusiasm as New York enters fiscally difficult times.
CHAPTER FOUR
ALTERNATIVE FUNDING FOR THE $600-MILLION HOUSING COMMITMENT
This Chapter focuses on the 1989 Agreement and Consent
contract that directs all available revenues from the
project to be paid in annual cash installments to the new
$600-million housing commitment of the BPCA. As outlined
in Chapter 3, the 1989 A&C stipulates that all revenues,
both existing subleases signed pre-1986 and those subleases
signed post-1986, must be used in the following manner: (i)
to pay all outstanding debt service payments on both
planned (those expected to be issued in the next three
years) and current outstanding bond issues; (ii) to pay for
the annual operating and maintenance costs of the project;
and then to (iii) pay cash installments, commencing in
1994, to fund the housing program in amounts specified by
the 1989 A&C. This hefty cash commitment must be funded
before any monies can be used to leverage additional funds
or be freed to provide amounts for the traditional 80%/20%
split.
Whenever available monies are used to pay cash instead
of for leveraging purposes an immediate question arises.
Would utilizing revenues to borrow funds achieve the same
goals, at no significant additional costs? Suppose the
1989 A&C did not exist, what level of bonds could be raised
to fund the same $600-million housing objective? Would
borrowing money versus paying cash prove to be a more
efficient way to fund the program? What would be the
subsequent implications and benefits? These questions are
analyzed by using an Alternative Leverage Scenario to
determine whether the 1989 A&C is truly the best structure
to fund the $600-million housing commitment of the BPCA.
Counting on Borrowed Money
Assumptions and Results: The alternative analysis (Leverage
New Housing Program) is different than the Base-Case
scenario in that it utilizes different funding sources to
fulfill the $600-million housing program. The Charts 4.1
and 4.2 outline the current BPC structure (Base Case) and
the new Alternative Scenario. Unlike the Base Case, the
Alternative Scenario calls for no cash payments under the
1989 A&C; instead Excess Revenues would be used to pay debt
service on newly leveraged amounts. This is an attempt to
determine whether the redirection of Excess Revenues can
support bonded amounts in excess of annual cash payments
from the same revenue source. If this proves to be the
case, then utilization of Excess Revenues to leverage
monies for funding of the housing program would seem to be
a more efficient use because the program could be fully
funded more rapidly and monies would be freed for other
uses earlier.
Under the alternative analysis, leveraged monies
become the primary source of funding for the housing
program, however, two additional sources - - Other Revenues
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and City Split monies - - are also utilized. As in the
Base-Case, Other Revenues required to meet annual shortfall
amounts are also used to fund the housing program. This
provides an apples-to-apples comparison as the amounts
required in the necessary years are exactly the same in
both scenarios. City split amounts are also identical in
both scenarios from 1990 through 1993 since the 1989 A&C
obligations do not commence until 1994. There is, however,
a significant difference after 1994 as these amounts are
still available under the Alternative Scenario.
A financial summary of the comparative analysis can be
found on the following page with complete financials in
Appendix B. Under both examples, Net Excess Revenues
available for application to the $600-million housing
program are exactly the same as nothing has changed
existing sublease revenues nor debt obligations on current
and planned financings. Under the Base-Case, Excess
Revenues in the amount of $233.1 million are directed to
pay annual cash payments in years 1994 through 2003. City
split monies, in the amount of $66.7 million, are also
available in the years 1990 through 1993 as the traditional
80%/20% split occurs during this time period. Finally,
Other Revenues in the amount of $300.2 million, fulfill the
monetary shortfalls in each of the years between 1994 and
2003.
The Alternative Scenario, however, takes a different
funding approach. Excess Revenues are not used to make
annual cash payments but are leveraged to provide a new
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Figure 4.3
COMPARI TIVE ANALYSIS
WITH A&C VS. WITHOUT A&C
BASE SCENARIO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
(With A&C) (W/out A&C)
lotat Tears
(1990-2020) 1990-2020
BREAKDOWN OF COMPONENTS (Millions) (Millions)
Revenues From Existing Subleases.... $6,643.4 $6643.4
Current Debt Service Obligations ............ 9067) (1 9067)
O&M/Adm. Costs ...................... 983.6) 9836)
Reserve Fund Interest ............... 68.7 68.7
Excess Revenue Fund (ERF) Amounts (1) ..... 3821.8 3821.8
Planned Financings Debt Service ...... 157.9) 157.9)
Net Excess Applied to Settlement
Agreement.....................................2,663.9 2,663.9
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM (@( $600 Million)
Excess Revenues Applied (2)..................... 233.1 0.0
City Sit Amounts (3)6.....................866.7 122.7
Other Revenues Needed (4)....................... 300.2 238.1
Leveraged Amounts ............ 0 239.2
Year Hsg. Program Achieved 2003 2000
FREED MONIES DUE TO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
Excess Revenues (2000-2003) (5)............. .n/a 18.5
City Split Amounts(2000-2003) (6).......... 67n/a 31.4
Other Revenues (20 0-2003) 7............... n/a 62.1
Joint Purpose Monies (1994- ;:::::: 20). ....... n/a 21.0
Total Freed Monies..................... 0 133.0
Freed Monies PV 8.00%) ............... 0 56.7
Excess Rev. Available for New Leverage (8) 2,364.1 2,541.2
FUTURE UNPLANNED LEVERAGE CAPABILITY
Leveraged Amounts ...200-203)(...................1,213.1 1,213.1
Net Proceed Amounts(9) 788.55.............. na 62.1
Debt Service on New Debt (10)............... (1,136.1) 13259.9)
Greatest Single Year Bonding Capacity ....... 0 131.4
(Year) 2000 2013
Excess Revenues Available For Split vrg(8.. 1,228.0 1,281.3
Discretionary Amounts
City Split (After Housing Contribution)..... 941.6 973.0
Joint Purpose Monies (Nominal Dollars) .... 286.4 308.3
FOOTNOTES (please see next page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. Center For Real Estate Development
FOOTNOTES
(1) $51 million of this amount is deposited into the Special Fund from 1990-1992 and is not
available for debt service in these years. In 1993, this amount becomes Joint Purpose Monies.
(2) Net excess revenues applied to the 1989 A reement and Consent ("A&C") for new hsg. program. In the case of leveraged
scenerio no excess revenues are paid to A&C and go for the purpose of leveraging monies and city split amounts.
(3) City split amounts used to fund new hsg. program. These amounts are approximately $56 million more under leveraged scenario
as result of their availability from 1994-20 03.
(4) These are additional revenues needed to meet the A&C hsg. obligations due to insufficient existing
sublease revenues. Their source is new Leases, transaction payments and anticipated future revenues
from subleases signed post 1986. The Leveraged scenario amount a (ies the same amount of Other Revenues
per year as the Base Case. The difference is a result of the earlier fulfillment of the hsg. program by 3 years
under the Alternative Leverage Scenario.
(5) Excess Revenues are directed to provide security for new leveraged amounts and remaining monies go as city split monies
to the housing program. As a result of early fulfillment of housing program under leveraged scenario, 18.5 million
are freed for other non-BPC purposes in the year 2003.
(6) This amount represents those City split amounts that are freed for other uses in the years 2001 and 2002. For these two
years the freed amount is approximately $40 million, however, $8.9 million is netted out to represent the amount
of greater City split amounts under the Base Case in the year 2003.
(7) Other Revenues freed from the period of 2000 through 2003.
(8) Represents Excess Revenues available for future unplanned leveraged amounts. Figure derived from taking Excess Revenues
applied to the Settlement Agreement less those amounts applied to the new housing program (City split amounts plus Excess Revenues).
(9) Represents 65% of bond proceeds to account for cost of issuance, capitalized interest, and reserve fund amounts.
(10) Debt service amount greater for leverage scenario due to amounts issued to fund housing program.
funding source of $239.2 million in debt. These bonded
amounts represent the maximum level Excess Revenues can
support and act as the substitute for cash payments made to
the housing program under the Base-Case. City split
amounts are also paid to the program on an annual basis
when they are available. There is a marked increase of $56
million ($122 million available under the Alternative
Scenario minus $66.7 million applied under the Base-Case)
as a direct result of utilizing Excess Revenues for
leveraging purposes. Unlike the Base-Case, commencing in
1994 Excess Revenues remain available for the traditional
80%/20% split. Since only half of the available Excess
Revenues are required in each year to meet a 2-times debt
coverage ratio on the new debt, Excess Revenues still
provide City split amounts in the years 1994 and
henceforth. The final funding source utilized is $238.1
million in Other Revenues. These amounts represent the
exact annual cash disbursements required under the
Base-Case, however the total amount is reduced due to early
fulfillment of the housing program under the Alternative
Scenario. Thus less aggregate monies are needed from this
revenue source.
Overall, the Alternative Scenario proves to be a much
more efficient method of funding the new housing program as
the $600-million commitment is met in the year 2000. Graph
4.4 shows the cumulative funding pattern of the housing
program under each scenario. As illustrated, the
Alternative Scenario achieves the new housing program three
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years earlier in an expedited fashion. The two scenarios
provide the same amount of funding to the program in the
years 1990 through 1993 as City split amounts are
identical. The difference is the rapid fashion the
Alternative Scenario funds the program from 1994 through
2000. This can be attributed to Excess Revenues being
utilized to leverage $239 million of new debt plus the
availability of greater City split amounts in those years.
The bar chart in Graph 4.5 illustrates the breakdown
of the funding sources under the Base Case. As
demonstrated in the graph, the housing program is funded
with City split amounts in the first three years ($66.7
million) and in the subsequent years depends solely on
Excess Revenues and Other Revenues. The total amounts
applied to the housing program in the years 1994 through
2003 reflect the exact amounts specified in the 1989 A&C
agreement. Heavy dependency on Other Revenues is necessary
as Excess Revenues are insufficient to meet the large cash
requirements in each year. This is especially evident in
the years 1994 through 1999 as the amount of available
Excess Revenues are almost entirely depleted in meeting
debt service payments on all outstanding planned and
current bond obligations. As existing sublease payments
become stronger each year with growing PILOT payments, more
Excess Revenues become available to fund the program. By
2003, only $18.5 million is needed to meet the $600-million
housing commitment and this can be funded solely by Excess
Revenues.
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The Alternative Scenario shown in Graph 4.6 directs
the same $66.7 million in City split amounts to the housing
program in first three years. In 1994, however, the
picture dramatically changes. In this year, as in the
remaining years, the amount of Other Revenue sources
applied are exactly the same as in the Base-Case. The new
funding sources available under this scenario, leveraged
amounts and City split monies, provide the nucleus for the
rapid timing for funding the program. In 1994, Excess
Revenues will support new debt in the net principal amount
of approximately $68 million for the program. Thus a total
of $81.1 million can be directed to the housing initiative
compared to only $13.2 million in the same year under the
Base-Case. Greater annual amounts of funding available
under the Alternative Scenario persist for the entire
period the housing commitment remains outstanding. It is
clear that new debt amounts exceed the amount of cash
payments that are available from Excess Revenues. It is
not until 1999 that Excess Revenues, in the form of
available cash, exceed those amounts that can support new
debt. This is more than compensated, however, by City
split amounts that are available under the Alternative
Scenario plus the same amount of Other Revenues in that
year (total funds equal $84.3 million vs. $79.2 million in
1999).
As a result of fulfilling the housing program by 2000,
significant monies are "freed" (after the payment of debt
service on the new housing bonds) for other nonBPC purposes
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Graph 4.6-Alternative Scenario
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sooner. Graph 4.7 illustrates the amount of freed monies
in the years 2000 through 2003 as a result of early
fulfillment of the program. Additionally, Joint Purpose
monies that are realized from 1994 through 2003 are
presented. In the year 2000, $4.5 million fewer Other
Revenue dollars are needed in the Alternative Scenario.
This amount, plus Joint Purpose Monies realized from 1994
through 2003, represent the first "freed" monies for other
uses. From 2001 through 2003, because housing obligations
have already been fulfilled, freed monies represent those
amounts that are still necessary to meet the program in the
remaining three years under the Base-Case. In 2001, this
amount is equal to approximately $31.7 million in Other
Revenues applied under the Base-Case plus an additional
$18.9 million in City split amounts that become available
from the traditional 80%/20% split under the Alternative
Scenario. The same phenomenon occurs in 2002 as additional
City split amounts and Other Revenues are freed for other
purposes in the amount of $47.2 million. In 2003, however,
the final $18.5 million in Excess Revenues applied under
the Base-Case can not be viewed as the aggregate amount
that is freed for other nonBPC purposes. This amount is
reduced by $8.9 million because fewer City split amounts
are available in that year under the Alternative Scenario
(i.e., $32.6 million City split amounts in 2003 for
Base-Case versus $23.7 under the Alternative Scenario);
this is the result of debt service payments due on the new
debt that was incurred to fund the housing program. Since
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no new bonds were issued to fund the program under the
Base-Case, City split amounts are greater in 2003.
Additionally, Joint Purpose Monies of $21 million are
realized under the Alternative Scenario from 1994 through
2003 that are not available under the Base Case. This
again is the result of Excess Revenues not going directly
to pay cash to the housing initiative but rather to support
new debt. 'This allows monies on an annual basis to be
split between the City and the BPCA under the original
terms of the Settlement Agreement.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The benefits of leveraging Excess Revenues to provide a
new funding source for the housing program are convincing.
Issuance of debt early and the availability of City split
monies can be utilized to rapidly meet the requirements of
the $600-million housing program. Excess Revenues, City
split amounts, Other Revenues, and Joint Purpose Monies are
maximized to free monies earlier ($133 million) for other
uses the public sector wishes to address. Although the
timing of the program being fully funded by 2000 is subject
to fluctuating PILOT payments, the reduced cash payments on
an annual basis under the Alternative Scenario puts less
pressure on the revenue flow of the project. This will
help mitigate any negative impact variations to the revenue
stream will have on the funding of the housing program.
The benefits are so numerous that one has to wonder
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why the City insists on all available revenues going to pay
cash to the new housing program. The most obvious reasons
are political. By assuring cash payments through the 1989
A&C, the City has immunized itself from other cash hungry
participants in the state striving to get a share of the
benefits from the "money machine". From a political
standpoint this is reasonable, however, protecting future
revenues is stretching the payment of money for housing
purposes over a longer period of time. In other terms, the
value, in 1990 dollars of the freed revenues is $56.7
million (present value at 8.00% of all freed monies
represented in graph 4.7) that could be used for other
nonhousing purposes earlier. The question becomes whether
protection of revenues is worth delaying significant
amounts for other public purpose objectives?
The following recommendation achieves early
fulfillment of the housing program, frees significant
monies, and protects future revenue streams from other
public entities in the State. An amendment to the 1989 A&C
should be drafted to require a reduced schedule of annual
payments required under the new housing program from
revenue flows of the BPCA. The new schedule should equal
those amounts that reflect the Other Revenue sources
necessary to fulfill the housing program under the
Alternative Leverage Scenario. The schedule on the
following page delineates the new payment schedule and
compares them to the existing obligations under the 1989
A&C:[1]
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Recommended ScheduleYear
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
$13,200,000
26,400,000
39,600,000
52,800,000
66,000,000
79,200,000
79,200,000
79,200,000
79,200,000
18,487,185
The freed Excess Revenues can then be utilized to
issue debt under the HNYC. The amended A&C Agreement would
stipulate that the State Legislature must pass additional
bonding authority to HNYC in the net proceeds amount of
$239 million. This amount represents the maximum leverage
capacity that Excess Revenues can support with a 2-times
debt coverage ratio in the years 1994 through 2000.
Additionally, the amended A&C would direct all available
City split monies to fund the new housing program as long
as the cumulative balance was less than $600 million.
This recommended structure accomplishes all of the
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$10,545,415
24,283,108
31,836,021
39,101,167
47,285,074
51,545,892
33,494,619
0
0
0
Current Schedule
desired goals of the City by assuring the dedication of
revenues for the new housing program. The way the program
is funded, however, is different. Inefficient annual cash
payments are reduced to a minimum and leveraging monies
becomes the new source of capital. Protection of monies to
fund the program are assured by the new A&C, and tremendous
amounts of money are thus relinquished early for other
nonhousing uses to the public sector. I recommend that the
BPCA, the City, and the State strongly consider this
alternative structure to fund the new $600-million housing
initiative.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATION
Unlike many large-scale real estate developments
today, one problem the BPC project does not have is
insufficient cash flow. Revenues from the commercial and
residential subleases channel a healthy flow of monies to
the BPCA, the City, and the State on an annual basis.
Although this has not always been the case, recent
activities funded by the "Excess Revenues" give new meaning
to that term: in addition to financing the infrastructure
and public amenities of the project, excess revenues have
underwritten city-wide policy initiatives established by
the Authority and the Mayor's office.
In the early stages of the project, financial support
from the State was necessary to create the initial 92-acre
landfill. When the project stalled and hit serious
financial snags, the State was forced to honor its moral
obligation to keep the Authority from defaulting on the
original 1972 bonds. In 1979 several events recast BPC's
financial future. BPCA switched the emphasis of the
project from residential to commercial use, the City
rewrote its deal with the Authority and provided
much-needed incentives to attract private developers to the
income-producing commercial sites, and, fortuitously,
conditions in Manhattan's real estate market improved
dramatically. Monies finally started to flow to the BPCA
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as development matured and, by 1986, they had reached
levels sufficient for the BPCA to repay its debt to the
State and raise additional capital to fund infrastructure
development. By the late 1980s, with all four World
Financial Centers open for occupancy, public officials
realized that surplus monies could be harnessed to fund
nonBPC purposes, in particular, the City's ten-year $1
billion housing initiative and City budget relief.
The ability to leverage funds from their long-term
subleases has been the cornerstone of the BPC's capital
structure. How these funds have been used and who has
benefitted from them is reflected by today's existing
commitments between the Authority and the City. What
happens with the new revenues sure to materialize in the
future is an open question. Determining how these
anticipated funds will be used and who will benefit over
the next 30 years from the project's financial bonanza is
pure speculation. BPC's success as a public developer,
however, puts the City in the enviable position of having
the revenues with which to make such choices.
Who Benefits
A summary of the sources and uses of funds that have
occurred to date is presented in Figure 5.1. Municipal
bond financings have been the primary source of capital
starting with the 1972-moral obligation bonds and ending
most recently with the 1990-budget relief transaction.
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Figure 5.1
Sources and Uses Of Bonds Issued By BPCA/HNYC 1972-1990
(Millions)
------------------------
~~-----------------------------------
SOURCES: BOND PROCEEDS PERCENT
--------------------------------------------------------- 
--------- ----------------------------
1972 Moral Oblig. Bds. $200.0 24.46%
1986 Special Oblig. Bds.
Series 1 103.9 12.71%
Series 2 46.7 5.71%
Series A 34.3 4.20%
1987 HNYC Revenue Bds. 210.0 25.69%
1990 BPCA Rev. Bds. 222.7 27.24%
TOTAL: 817.5 100.00%
COSTS OF BPCA PROJECT REPAYMENT OF $400 MILLION OTHER NON
USES: ISSUANCE COSTS STATE ADVANCES HOUSING PROGRAM BPCA USES TOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
----------------------------
1972 Moral Oblig. Bds. $200.0
Net Proceeds $135.8 $6.0 -0-
Capitalized Interest 40.6
Debt Service Reserve 14.3 -
Fees 3.3 - -
03
Un 1986 Special Oblig. Bds. - 184.9Net Proceeds 53.5 69.1 -8-
Capitalized Interest 35.1 - - - - -
Debt Service Reserve 15.8 - -
Insurance Premium 7.9 - - - - -
Fees 3.5 - -
1987 HNYC Revenue Bonds
Net Proceeds - -142.6 - 210.0
Capitalized Interest 41.1 -
Debt Service Reserve 21.1 - - - - -
Insurance Premium 0.8 -- - - -
Fees 3.0 - - -
Original Issue Discoun 0.2
Other Costs 1.2 - ~
1990 BPCA Revenue Bds.
Net Proceeds - - - 150.0 222.7
Capitalized Interest 37.0 - - - -
Debt Service Reserve 20.0 -- - - -
Fees 2.2
Original Issue Discoun 12.7 - - - -
Other Costs 0.8 - - - -
TOTAL: 260.5 189.4 75.1 142.6 150.0 817.5
PERCENT: 31.86% 23.16% 9.18% 17.44% 18.35% 100.00%
Footnote: Figures derived from all BPCA and HNYC Official Statements from 1972 through 1990.
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. Center For Real Estate Development
Since 1972, bonds issued by the BPCA and HNYC have exceeded
over $817 million. In line with a prioritized agenda
formulated by the City, the State, and the BPCA over the
past several years, these funds have been used for several
purposes. Initially, the bond proceeds went solely to pay
for the pre-development costs of the project. Not until
1986 were sufficient revenues available for the BPCA to
issue additional bonds, $185.8 million, which were used to
repay the State for its bailout assistance and to fund
additional infrastructure costs of the project. That trip
to the capital market signified an important turning point
of the BPC project. With the "basics" under control,
subsequent financings could be used to fund other nonBPC
purposes.
Housing was the first item on the list of nonBPC
public wants. In 1986 the Authority agreed to guarantee
up to $400 million (net proceeds) for city-wide housing,
and in 1986 the newly formed HNYC issued $209 million in
housing revenue bonds on the strength of BPC's existing
revenues. The second item on the list - - City budget
relief - - was a unique, though unanticipated, demand on
BPC's revenues. Hoping to avoid the need to call on
Albany for funds, the City negotiated with the BPCA, and
in 1990 $223 million in revenue bonds were issued to
provide $150 million in net funds to the City. Although
these bonds did not represent a new layer of priority or
an ongoing commitment of the BPCA, it demonstrated the
flexibility of BPC's capital structure. In this case,
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State and City officials agreed that the financial perils
of the City (hopefully temporary) should take priority
over other nonBPC public initiatives, and thus Excess
Revenues were temporarily redirected from the $400-million
housing program to fund this one time budget need of the
City.
One striking measure of the project's overall
financial success is the large amount of money raised to
date beyond the small amount necessary to fund the project
itself. Out of the $817 million in bond proceeds, only
$189 million, or 23 percent, has been used for actual
project costs; an additional $75 million (9 percent) can
be considered project costs since these monies were used to
repay the State for advances made to fund the initial
landfill and infrastructure work plus to pay debt service
on the 1972 bonds. A majority of the monies, however, have
gone to fund nonBPC uses (36 percent) or to cover the
costs of issuance (32 percent). Monies used for the
benefit of the City's housing initiative and budget relief
total $292 million compared to $264 million ($189 million
plus $75 million) for total project costs. It has cost a
lot to issue all these bonds - - $260 million - - because
the long lead time before projects would start generating
PILOTs meant large amounts of capitalized interest were
necessary to fund debt service during the nonrevenue phase
of the project.
In Chapter 3, the Base-Case analysis illustrates the
project's capacity to support significant capital
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expenditures in the future. Figure 5.2 summarizes the
sources and uses of funds that can be expected over the
next thirty years. The BPCA's immediate financing plans
over the next three years include approximately $511
million in bond proceeds ($417 million HNYC debt and $93
million BPCA debt); in terms of net amounts, $257 million
will go towards fulfilling the BPCA's $400-million housing
obligation to the City and $56 million will pay for the
remaining infrastructure needs of the project.
As revenues from the project continue to mount over
time, three sources of funds - - Excess Revenues, Other
Revenues, and Unplanned Financings - - will become the
primary funding source of all future policy goals. Excess
Revenues, around $1.5 billion, will be utilized several
ways. First, pursuant to the 1989 A&C, they will fund
annual cash installments for BPCA's $600-million
commitment to the New York Housing Program. These payments
commencing in 1994 and continuing until the new housing
obligation has been fulfilled in 2003, total over $299.8
million. Other Revenues, those monies available from
subleases signed post-1986 and transaction payments,
totalling $300 million will provide the additional
funding for the housing program over the next 10 to 13
years. Once all project costs have been met and the total
$1-billion housing program fulfilled, Excess Revenues can
then be used for two purposes: (i) to provide security
for additional unplanned leveraged amounts, and (ii) for
the 80%/20% split between the City and the BPCA. Unplanned
Figure 5.2
Future Sources and Uses Of Funds, BPCA, 1990-2020
(Millions)
---------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------
SOURCES: BOND PROCEEDS CASH TOTAL PERCENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------
Planned HNYC Debt
1990 Issue $227.1 - $417.6 11.76%
1991 Issue 84.4 - -
1992 Issue 59.2 - -
1993 Issue 46.9 - -
Planned BPCA Debt
1991 Issue 37.6 - 93.5 2.63%
1992 Issue 55.9 -
Excess Revenues (1) - 1,527.8 1,527.8 43.01%
(1990-2020)
Other Revenues (2) - 300.2 300.2 8.45%
(1994-2003)
Unplanned Bonding Potential
Max Leveraging (3) 1,213.1 1,213.1 34.15%
---------------------------------------------------------- 
=== - -
TOTAL: 1,724.2 1,828.0 3,552.2 100.00%
ASSUMED
COSTS OF BPCA PROJECT $400 MILLION $600 MILLION OTHER NON CITY SPLIT JOINT PURPOSE
00 USES: ISSUANCE COSTS HOUSING PROGRAM HOUSING PROGRAM BPCA USES MONIES MONIES TOTALk ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planned HNYC Debt
1990 Issue $87.1 - $1
1991 Issue 32.4 -
1992 Issue 22.7 -
1993 Issue 18.0 -
Planned BPCA Debt
1991 Issue 15.1 22.5 -
1992 Issue 22.4 33.5 -
Excess Revenues (4) - - -
(1990-2020) -- -
Other Revenues - - -
(1994-2003) - - -
Unplanned Financings - 4 -
Max Leveraging 424.6
TOTALS: 622.3 56.0
PERCENT: 17.52% 1.58%
(Footnotes on following page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. Center For Real Estate Development
$417.640.0
52.0
36.5
28.9
93.5
941.6299.8
300.2
286.4 1,527.8
300.2
- - - 1,213.1
788.5 ---
257.4 600.0 788.5 941.6 286.4 3,552.2
7.25% 16.89% 22.20% 26.51% 8.06% 100.00%
FOOTNOTES
(1) Revenues available from pre-1986 subleases after debt service on planned and unplanned
financings and annual operating/maintenance costs.
(2) Revenues from post-1986 leases that are necessary to fulfill $600 million housing program.
from 1994 through 2002.
(3) Financings after the $600 million housing program is fulfilled. Leveraged proceeds available
for non-BPCA uses.
(4) Includes $233.1 million in excess revenues and $66.7 million in City split amounts that
are used to fund $600 million housing program in the years 1990 through 2003.
(5) All information is derived from Appendix A, Base Case Scenario - - Complete Financials.
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financings could yield $788 million in net proceeds over
the next thirty years for any use the City and State agree
upon. Direct cash to the City and the BPCA could
approximate $1.3 billion as City split amounts will reach
$941 million and Joint Purpose monies, $286 million.
The magnitude of these figures indicates the strength
of the "money machine". As Figure 5.3 shows, the
revenues from the project have been, and will continue to
be, a solid nucleus for leveraging monies and providing
cash for not only the project but also other public-sector
goals. From the start of the project in 1968 until 2020,
total net funding resources will have totalled a staggering
$4.4 billion. With the exception of the $300 million in
Other Revenues needed to fund the housing initiative, most
of these monies will come from the existing commercial
and residential sublease revenues. Furthermore, if future
development on the site proves successful, the total
resources will grow exponentially as new sublease revenues
would add significant leveraging capability and a marked
increase in cash disbursements (Discretionary Amounts) to
the City and the BPCA.
Who benefits from this enormous funding source the BPC
project has become? It appears that the City has been and
will continue to be the main recipient of funds for the
next several years. Graph 5.4, indicates who benefits from
the funding patterns to date and in the future. As
illustrated, the City has received $150 million for budget
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Figure 5.3
Combined Current and Future Sources and Uses of BPCA Funds, 1972-2020
(Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCES: PROCEEDS CASH TOTAL PERCENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BPCA Outstanding Debt $607.5 - $607.5 13.90%
HNYC Outstanding Debt 210.0 - 210.0 4.81%
Planned HNYC Debt 417.6 - 417.6 9.56%
Planned BPCA Debt 93.5 - 93.5 2.14%
Excess Revenues (2) - 1,527.8 1,527.8 34.96%
(1990-2020)
Other Revenues (3) - 300.2 300.2 6.87%
(1994-2003)
Unplanned Bondin 1,213.1 1,213.1 27.76%
Potential (4) -----
TOTAL: 2,541.7 1,828.0 4,369.7 100.00%
COSTS OF BPCA PROJECT REPAYMENT OF $400 MILLION $600 MILLION OTHER NON CITY SPLIT JOINT PURPOSE
USES: ISSUANCE COSTS STATE ADVANCES HOUSING PROGRAM HOUSING PROGRAM BPCA USES MONIES MONIES TOTAL
BPCA Outstanding Debt $193.1 $189.4 $75.1 - - $150.0 - $607.5
HNYC Outstanding Debt 67.4 - 142.6 - - - - 210.0
Planned HNYC Debt 160.2 - 257.4 - - - - 417.6
Planned BPCA Debt 37.5 56.0 - - - - - - 93.5
Excess Revenues (5) - - - - 299.8 941.6 286.4 1,527.8(1990-2020)
Other Revenues -
(1994-2003)
Unplanned Financings 424.6
TOTAL: 882.8 245.4 75.
PERCENT: 20.20% 5.61% 1.7
(Footnotes on following page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, MIT Center for Real Estate Development
300.2 300.2
788.5 1213.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 400.0 600.0 938.5 941.6 286.4 4,369.7
2% 9.15% 13.73% 21.48% 21.55% 6.55% 100.00%
FOOTNOTES
(1) These include the 1972, 1986, and 1990 BPCA bond issues.
(2) Revenues available from Pre 1986 subleases after debt service on Planned and Unplanned
financings plus annual operating/maintenance costs.
(3) Revenues from Post 1986 leases that are necessary to fulfill $600 million housing program.
from 1994 through 2002.
(4) Financings after the $600 million housing program is fulfilled. Proceeds available
for non-BPCA uses.
(5) Includes $233.1 million in excess revenues and $66.7 million in City split amounts that
are used to fund $600 million housing program in the years 1990 through 2003.
(6) All information is derived from Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
Graph 5.4-Who Benefits From BPC Funds?
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relief and by 1993, the City's $400-million housing program
will have been funded from bond proceeds. Furthermore,
by 2003 BPCA will have funded the remaining $600-million
housing commitment in cash from revenues of the project.
Once the $1-billion New York Housing Program has been
fully funded, Excess Revenues will continue to provide cash
on an annual basis to the City from 2003 to 2020, in round
numbers, about $941 million. Joint Purpose Monies should
approximate $286 million, another benefit to the City
since their use is subject to negotiations between the City
and BPCA. If the past is any indication, a majority of
these funds will go to the City, especially as Battery Park
City gets built out and its monetary expenditures decline.
Finally, it is speculative to guess who will benefit from
the $788 million in unplanned leveraged amounts. The
year 2000 is the earliest the BPCA will be able to issue
bonds other than those planned to meet the immediate
infrastructure needs of the project and the housing
program. The purpose of these funds, likely be decided
jointly between the City and State, will reflect the
major policy objectives of the public sector at that time.
Hopefully, by then, monies will not be necessary to fund a
City budget deficit.
Interestingly, in terms of dollar flows (only), the
entity that least benefits from the tremendous availability
of funds is the real estate project itself. By 1993 when
the last anticipated capital expenditures are dedicated
to the project, only 7.3% (project costs including state
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repayments) of the total funding resources will have been
dedicated to developing BPC. This amount will increase
somewhat as a portion of Joint Purpose monies and unplanned
leveraged amounts flow to the project over time. These
additional amounts, however, will still remain relatively
small in proportion to the amount of total funding
resources available.
Ironically, the fact that the bricks-and-mortar
portion of the project receives the least money from the
financial success of the development captures the true
essence of the BPC capital structure. Why? In simplified
terms - - the capital structure turned out to be ingenious
and the use of money efficient. First, the public sector
undertook the risk of creating new land and infrastructure
and enticing private development to the site. Second, the
land was leased, not sold, to private interests,
developers. In pricing the lease BPCA negotiators
structured payments (PILOTs) to reflect the value of
increasing assessments, with an eye toward boosting public
coffers as the project development matured. Once revenues
reached sufficient levels, monies would be used to fund
additional infrastructure needs of the project and to repay
any cash disbursement expended to date. As the project
gets built out, its capital needs diminish and the
surpluses, after the payment of all outstanding debt and
project costs, are parlayed into other uses. The project -
- now a "money machine" - - funds other essential needs of
the public sector in the future. With the benefit of a
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long-term perspective, this type of public development
minimizes expenditures made to the actual project relative
to the significant funding used for other, nonproject
objectives. This indeed is a brilliant scheme with
phenomenal financial benefits realized by the public
sector!
Risks Ahead
What, if any, are the risks ahead for the BPCA? As
demonstrated in Chapter Three, the Authority's revenue
stream from existing sublease payments, at a conservative
annual 4.5% growth rate, will produce close to $6.7
billion over a 30-year period, easily supporting current
and planned BPCA and HNYC debt obligations. Furthermore,
these revenues will provide tremendous benefits to the
public sector beyond the- bricks and mortar, open spaces,
and amenities on the project site. The risk, therefore,
does not seem to be the stability of the existing revenue
stream, but rather the future plans of the project.
What the Authority is planning for the future is
ambitious, reasonably so given its track record. The City,
has agreed to provide funds necessary to cover the cost of
construction, approximately $141 million, for the
Stuyvesant High School to be located in the
northeastern-most corner of the BPC site. Additional
residential development to the north and south of the
World Financial Center, is progressing rapidly; one
building has been recently completed and construction of
two other units are underway. Developers of two more
residential projects have been selected and construction is
scheduled to begin soon. The BPCA has publicly announced
plans to create nearly $100 million worth of elaborate
public parks covering close to 30 acres, in an effort to
make BPC a recreational center for all New Yorkers.[1]
The potential risk is that these new plans are overly
ambitious, especially given Manhattan's current weak real
estate market. If this is the case, revenues from
existing subleases could be affected. Not the dollar
amount generated, but rather how they get allocated. The
Authority, for example, might have to redirect existing
sublease revenues to support new developments having
difficulty with leasing and consequently meeting their
immediate obligations. Redirecting existing sublease
monies in this way could potentially delay funding the
$600-million housing program and reduce the leverage
capability and discretionary amounts available to the City
and the BPCA in the future. A significant, though
intangible additional effect of weak revenue-producing
development, could reduce investor confidence in the BPCA
outstanding debt if redirection of revenues is perceived
as a threat to the financial integrity of the bonds. This
would be detrimental in several ways: (i) the BPCA's cost
of borrowing for future financings might be higher,
thereby reducing leverage capability; (ii) all bonds
outstanding (with the possible exception of the insured
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bonds) might trade at significant discounts; and (iii)
potential review of all bonds outstanding by the rating
agencies could result in a possible downgrading.
BPCA's final risk lies with the stability of the
commercial tenants themselves since they provide the core
source of income for existing sublease payments. Currently
O&Y and American Express are the main leasees of the
commercial parcels, with subtenants consisting primarily of
financially oriented firms. Both American Express and O&Y
are credit-worthy tenants and represent excellent risks,
however, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
subtenants represent a potential credit problem in
today's economic environment. What are the potential
implications of an increase in vacancy on the commercial
parcels to the public sector?
For practical purposes, even if significant space in
the WFC becomes vacant due to continued cutbacks on Wall
Street, it is highly unlikely that either O&Y or American
Express would default on their lease obligations to the
BPCA. Although revenues to O&Y and American Express would
shrink, infringing on the profitability from their
investment, a default on lease obligations would indicate
that the companies themselves were probably on the road
to bankruptcy, unable to find alternative funds to meet
scheduled lease payments. Default would never be in the
best interest of the current leasees. However, if this
doomsday scenario were to happen, the BPCA would still
face minimal risk; the leasehold mortgage lenders behind
O&Y and American Express would foreclose on the properties
and most likely assume the lease payment obligations. The
BPCA can take comfort in knowing the lenders on the
commercial development phase are some of the most
financially solvent institutions in the world today (Sanwa,
Sumitomo, Manufactures Hanover Trust and others).[2]
Finally, if the lenders for some unknown reason decided not
to meet these unsubordinated lease payment obligations, the
project would revert to the BPCA, and the State would now
own an asset worth approximately $3 to $5 billion. The
risk would be reduced to asset management of the property.
For the public sector, the probability of the BPC
project entering financially difficult times seems
remote. Currently operating projects provide revenues
sufficient to fund current obligations and, more
importantly, other significant policy objectives
established by the City and the State. Chapter Three
demonstrated that significant reductions to PILOT payments
would have to occur (greater than 2.4% annually) for a long
period of time before the BPCA would falter in meeting any
of its current financial obligations. A sustained
reduction in PILOTs of this magnitude, for a long period of
time, seems difficult to imagine given the duration of past
real estate cycles in New York and the historical
increase in tax collections over the past 20 years. From
this perspective, therefore, all existing and planned
financings of the BPCA and HNYC are excellent credits
backed by ample revenues to meet debt service payments on
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these bonds. The real risk to the public sector is that
over ambitious development plans might reduce the total
benefit package it can expect to realize over a
thirty-year period. The $600-million housing program could
be delayed if Excess Revenues have to be redirected for
any reason.
The future should prove to be prosperous for the
project. Unlike the 1970s, the greatest issue in the 1990s
and 2000s will not be how to generate revenues, but rather
how to allocate the financial benefits the "money machine"
is likely to produce. It is somewhat unusual for a
public/private partnership to develop a massive project,
from scratch, that can be cheered by design experts, public
policy makers, financial minds, architects, and, most of
all, the average person. Battery Park City merits this
respect and more. The early vision and continuing faith
both the State and the City provided to the project in its
infancy has produced a magnificent financial resource the
public sector can tap for many years to come. From the
days of vacant land and no revenues to a time of bustling
development and generous cash flow, Battery Park City has
become a public-sector financial dream, worthy of emulation
by all major cities across our nation.
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continually relied upon in the thesis.
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Flow Study", Appendix C, May 31, 1990, pp.la-43.
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City of New York, Amendment to Settlement
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housing program scheduled payments commence in 1994. I have
assumed that this $50 million remittance to the City will be
applied to the housing program. This amount ($50 million)
is represented as City split amounts and is fulfilled in
the year 1992. It should be understood that the City might
have previously earmarked these monies for other uses,
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which would impact the timing of the housing program being
fully funded.
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1. Amounts for the scheduled payments pursuant to the 1989
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with the City of New York, Agreement and Consent, December
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APPENDIX A
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EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prj t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT :
Hsg. Program Pmts. per A&C (8)
Other Revenues Needed (9)
NET EXCESS AVAILABLE FOR SPLIT:
City Split Used For Hsg.(80%) (10)
(Cummulative New Housing Program
Plus City Split)
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (11)
Leverage Capability (12)
New Bond De t Service
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS W/ LEVERAGE:
Total City Split Monies (13)
Total Joint Purpose Monies W/ Leverage
FOOTNOTES: (See on last Page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
APPENDIX A
BASE CASE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
47 678,092 54 317 728 62,224,294 70,188,600 78,754,237 87,959,412
6,797,374 7,895'530 8,927,555 9,951,377 10,975,198 12,394,134
12,547,006 13,843,345 15,035,896 16,147,148 17,485,304 19,033,111
----------------------------------------------------------------
$67,022,472 $76,056,603 $86,187,745 $96,287,125 $107,214,739 $119,386,657
(14 285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(13,900,000) (14,595,000) (15,324,750) (16,090,988) (16,895,537) (17,740,314)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000
----------------------------------------------------------------
39,552,472 47,891,603 57,292,995 66,626,138 76,749,202 88,076,343
(13,108,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
0 0 0 (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990
0 0 0 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
------ ===----====-------------------------------------------
27,235,462 32,787,593 42,188,985 31,500,775 41,623,840 52,950,981
(17,000,000) (17,000,000) (17,000,000) 0 0 0
0 0 0 (16,000 000) (16,000 000) (16,000 000)
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.97 .60 1.31
----------------------------------
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 25,623,840 36,950,981
0 0 0 0 (2,983,011) (7,424,382)0 0 0 0 (19, 986,244) (7,409,706)
~---------------------------------
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 2,654,585 2,116,892
0 0 0 0 (13,200,000) (26,400,000)
0 0 0 0 10,545,415 24,283,108
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 0 0
10,235,462
10,235,462
15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 0 0
26,023,055 51,212,040 66,712,815 79,912,815 106,312,815
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
10,235,4620 15,787,593 25,188,985 
15,500,775
0 0 51,000,000
---------------------------------------------------------
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND (IERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prj t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT :
Hsg. Program Pmts. per A&C (8)
Other Revenues Needed (9)
NET EXCESS AVAILABLE FOR SPLIT:
City Split Used For Hsg.(80%) (10)
(Cummutative New Housing Program
Plus City Split)
Max. Avail, for Debt Service (11)
Leverag Ca pability (12)
New Bond Debt Service
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS W/ LEVERAGE:
Total City Split Monies (13)
Total Joint Purpose Monies W/ Leverage
FOOTNOTES: (See on last Page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
APPENDIX A
BASE CASE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
97,098,348 105 322,128 112,476,224 118,383,099 123,710,338 129,277,304 135,094,782
13,394,453 14,394,949 15,760,650 19,149,408 27,716,780 28,757,535 29,117,602
20,638,658 22,406,334 23,580,565 24,250,945 24,976,523 25,758,504 26,655,552
--------------------- =------------------------------------------------
$131,131,459 $142,123,411 $151,817,439 $161,783,452 $176,403,641 $183,793,343 $190,867,936
(14 285,000) (14 285,000) (14 285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(18,627,329) (19,558,696) (20,536,631) (21,563,462) (22,641,635) (23,773,717) - (24,962,403)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000
---------------------------------------------------------------------
98,934,130 108,994,715 117,710,808 126,649,990 140,192,006 146,449,626 152,335,533
(15 895,000) (15 895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,64763,80,767 73,89,353 82,55,44-91,24,62-0507--------------------------------------
63,808,767 73,869,353 82,585,446 91,524,627 105,066,643 111,324,263 117,210,171
0
(16,0 0000)
1.99
0
(16,000 000)4.62
0
(19,700 000)
t.33
0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000)
4.19 4.65
0
(19,700.000)
5.95
0
(19,700 000)$.65
47,808,767 57,869,353 62,885,446 71,824,627 85,366,643 91,624,263 97,510,171
(7 424 382) (7 424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)(32,620,405) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
7,763,979 13,698,833 18,714,926 27,654,108 41,196,124 47,453,744 53,339,651
(39,600,000) (52,800,000) (66,000,000) (79,200,000) (79,200,000) (79,200,000) (79,200,000)
31,836,021 39,101,167 47,285,074 51,545,892 38,003,876 31,746,256 25,860,349
---------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
145,912,815 198,712,815 264,712,815 343,912,815 423,112,815 502,312,815 581,512,815
0 0 0 0 0 00
0 0 0 0 367,972,913 35,871,483 37,192,03:0 0 0 0 0 0
-------------------------------------
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-----------------------
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prjt.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT :
Hsg. Program Pmts. per A&C (8)
Other Revenues Needed (9)
NET EXCESS AVAILABLE FOR SPLIT:
City Split Used For Hsg.(80%) (10)
(Cummulative New Housing Program
Plus City Split)
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (11)
Leverage Capability (12)
New Bond De t Service
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS W/ LEVERAGE:
Total City Split Monies (13)
Total Joint Purpose Monies W/ Leverage
APPENDIX A
BASE CASE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
141 174 048 147,526,880 154 165,589 161 103,041 168,352,678 175,928,548 183,845,333
29,399,439 29,615 998 29,824,365 30,023,703 30,197,704 30,510,162 30,263,743
27,470,298 28,316,232 29,217,952 30,133,363 31,091,427 32,080,338 33,120,125
---------------------------------------------------------------------
$198,043,785 $205,459,110 $213,207,906 $221,260,107 $229,641,809 $238,519,048 $247,229,201
(14 285,000) (14 285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(26,210,523) (27,521,049) (28,897,102) (30,341,957) (31,859,055) (33,452,007) (35,124,608)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000
---------------------------------------------------- 
------------------
158,263,262 164,368,061 170,740,804 177,348,150 184,212,754 191,497,041 198,534,593
(15 895,000) (15 895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
---------------- =------------------------------------------------------
123,137,899 129,242,698 135,615,442 142,222,788 149,087,392 156,371,678 163,409,231
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 00I )
t.25 t.56 t.88 .22 t.57 t.94 A.2'
103,437,899 109,542,698 115,915,442 122,522,788 129,387,392 136,671,678 143,709,231
(7 424,382) (7,424,382) (7 424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)(36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
59,267,380 65,372,179 71,744,922 78,352,268 85,216,872 92,501,159 99,538,711
(18,487,185) 0 0 0 0 0 0
40,780,195 65,372,179 71,744,922 78,352,268 85,216,872 92,501,159 99,538,711
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
600,000,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 32,686 089 35 872,461 39 176,134 42,608,436 46,250,579 49,769,356
38,640,113 41,002,458 39,613,621 29,479,950 47,754,825 58,024,231 60,321,060
0 (32,686,089) (35,872,461) (39,176,134) (42,608,436) (46,250,579) (49,769,356)
----------------------------------------------------------------
0 32,686,089 35,872,461 39,176,134 42,608,436 46,250,579 49,769,356
32 624 156 26,148,872 28,697,969 31,340,907 34,086,749 37,000,463 39,815,485
8,156,039 6,537,218 7,174,492 7,835,227 8,521,687 9,250,116 9,953,871
---------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTNOTES: (See on Last Page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Pr t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT :
Hsg. Program Pmts. per A&C (8)
Other Revenues Needed (9)
NET EXCESS AVAILABLE FOR SPLIT:
City Split Used For Hsg.(80%) (10)
APPENDIX A
BASE CASE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
192 118 373 200,763,700 209,798,066 219,238,979 229,104,733 239,414,446 250,188, 09t
27,878,024 28,123,689 28,228,605 28,338,600 27,527,425 23,014,176 23,112,08'
34,226,291 35,663,218 38,768,467 41,966,945 43,185,173 44,452,130 45,769,76
---------------------------------------------------------------------
$254,222,688 $264,550,607 $276,795,138 $289,544,524 $299,817,331 $306,880,752 $319,069,943
(14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(36,880,838) (38,724,880) (40,661,124) (42,694,180) (44,828,889) (47,070,334) (49,423,850)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 0 0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
203,771,850 212,255,727 222,564,014 233,280,344 241,418,442 259,810,418 269,646,093
(15 895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
---------------------------------------------------------------------
168,646,487 177,130,365 187,438,652 198,154,981 206,293,079 224,685,056 234,520,730
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,9,7 0 100 000) (19,700000)
A.56 A.99 .51 16.06 10.47 11.41 11.90
---------------------------------------------------------------------
148,946,487 157,430,365 167,738,652 178,454,981 186,593,079 204,985,056 214,820,730
(7 424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)(36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
104,775,968 113,259,845 123,568,132 134,284,462 142,422,560 160,814,536 170,650,211
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
104,775,968 113,259,845 123,568,132 134,284,462 142,422,560 160,814,536 170,650,211
(Cummulative New Housing Program 0
Plus City Split)
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (11)
Leverage Capability (12)
New Bond Debt Service
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS W/ LEVERAGE:
Total City Split Monies (13)
Total Joint Purpose Monies W/ Leverage
FOOTNOTES: (See on last Page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
52 387 984 56 629 923 61,784,066 67,142,231 71,211,280 80,407,268
45,808,472 103,526,444 55,363,945 131,359,460 59,836,187 61,357,953(52'387'984) (56'629'923) (61 784 066) (67,142,231) (71,211,280) (80,407,268)
85,325,105
0
(85,325,105)
52,387,984 56,629,923 61,784,066 67,142,231 71,211,280 80,407,268 85,325,105
41 910,387 45 303 938 49,427,253 53,713,785 56,969,024 64,325,815 68,260,084
10,477,597 11,325,985 12,356,813 13,428,446 14,242,256 16,081,454 17,065,021
--------------------------------------------------------
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income ( )
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prj t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT :
Hsg. Program Pmts. per A&C (8)
Other Revenues Needed (9)
NET EXCESS AVAILABLE FOR SPLIT:
City Split Used For Hsg.(80%) (10)
(Cummutative New Housing Program
Plus City Split)
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (11)
Leverage Capability (12)
New Bond De t Service
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS W/ LEVERAGE:
Total City Split Monies (13)
Total Joint Purpose Monies W/ Leverage
FOOTNOTES: (See on last Page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
APPENDIX A
BASE CASE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
2017 2018 2019 2020
261,446,560 273,211,656 285,506,180 298,353,958
21,187,106 21,221,797 21, 258,572 9,541,630
47,140,107 48,565,262 50,047,422 51,588,870
$329,773,773 $342,998,715 $356,812,174 $359,484,458
(51,895,043) (54,489,795) (57,214,285) (60,074,999)
0 0 0 0
277,878,730 288,508,920 299,597,889 299,409,459
0 0 0 0
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
0 0 0 0
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
257,857,378 268,487,567 279,576,537 279,388,106
0 0 0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000)11.09 11.63 14.19 14.18
238,157,378 248,787,567 259,876,537 259,688,106
(7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)
(36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
193,986,858 204,617,048 215,706,017 215,517,587
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
193,986,858 204,617,048 215,706,017 215,517,587
96,993,429 102,308,524 107,853,009 107,758,793
0 0 0 0
(96,993,429) (102,308,524) (107,758,793) (107,758,793)
96,993,429 102,308,524 107,947,224 107,758,793
77,594,743 81,846,819 86,357,779 86,207,035
19,398,686 20,461,705 21,589,445 21,551,759
FOOTNOTES:
(1) Derived from 1990 Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. BPCA Pro Forma Cash Flow Study. These figures reflect only those
revenues derived from Existing Sublease Revenues and do not include Post-1986 Leases, Transaction payments , New Leases,
Lump Sum Payments or Future Revenues. Assumed growth rate is 4.5% per year.
(2) The 1990 O&M/Ackninistrative budgeted amounts is $13,900,000 with a 5% growth rate for the remaining
years.
(3) Reserve Fund Deposit amount is $14,300,000 which approximates the original deosit to the reserve fund.
The deposits for the 1986 and 1987 reserve funds are $15 819 802 and 521,072,949 respectively. These amounts
also represent original deposit amounts and all reserve funds assume an investment earnings rate of 5%.
(4) Pursuant to the Ammendment to First Dedication Instrument dated 9/15/1987, capitalized interest was extended
to cover interest through 1992 on the 1987 HNYC bonds. Assume first principal and interest payment to occur in 1993.
(5) Pursuant to the 1990 Revenue Bond Resolution, excess revenue funds available are to deosited into a Special Fund
so that the amount is not in excess of $17 million in 1990, $34 million in 1991, and $51 million in 1992.
The purpose is to provide additional coverage for the 1990 bonds in case of insufficient revenues. The monies are available
for any purpose the City and Authority jointly decide after 1992. The antaysis assumes that the monies are deposited
in the Fund for three years and then are released as Joint Purpose Monies in 1993 as reflected by the $51 million in Joint
Purpose monies in 1993 plus the traditional split that occurs from Available Amounts. During the years 1990-1992 the analysis
assumes that all remaining Available Amounts, after deposit to Special Fund, go to the City as split amounts and are used
to fund the obligations under the 1989 A&C.
(6) Assumes BPCA anticipated future infrastructure financings of $22.5 million and $33.5 million net proceeds in 1991 and 1992
respectively. Net Proceeds account for 67% of bonds issued to account for three years of capitalized interest costs of issuance,
and reserve fund deposits. Figures derived from 1990 Amendment to Agreement as to Certain Excess Revenues of BPCA,
5/18/90 estimated schedule.
(7) Assumes HNYC anticipated future financings for the Housing New York Program of $140 million $52 million,$36.5 million, and $28.9 million in net proceeds for the consecutive years commencing in 190 and ending in 1993.
Net Proceeds account for 62.22% of bonds issued to account for 4 years of capitalizd interest, costs of issuance,
reserve fund deposits.
H (8) Amounts given in the 1989 A&C commencing in 1994 and ending when hsg. program fulfilled. Amounts to be paid
excess revenues, prior to traditional 80%/20% split, and other revenues available. See next footnote.
(9) Necessary revenues from sources other than existing subleases (i.e., new leases, transaction payments etc)
to pay for commitment under the A&C housing obligations.
(10) Amounts available for City split that go to fund the A&C obligations. I have assume that the $50 remittance to the City obligation
under the 1989 A&C will go to fund the new housing program. Therefore, this amount ($50 million) is shown as City split amounts and
is fulfilled by 1992.
(11) Assumes a conservative 2 times debt coverage ratio.
(12) Assumes the first year leveraged amounts could be issued would be 2000, and assumes 3 full years of capitalized interest.
(13) City split amounts are not available from 1994 until 2003 because excess revenues before the split is being used to fund$600 million housing obligation.
* All figures are derived from the 1986 and 1990 Battery Park City Authority Official Statements, as well
as the 1987 Housing New York Corporation Official Statement. A&C annual payments are derived from
the 1989 Agreement and Consent document.
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APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
P edged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Pr t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO LEVERAGE
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (8)
Leverage Capability (9)
New Bond Debt Service
NET AVAILABLE AMOUNTS
City Split (80%)
Joint Purpose Monies (20%)
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM:
City Split Monies (10)
Other Revenues (11)
Leveraged Amounts
CummuLative Housing Balance
Extra Monies Paid per A&C (12)
City Split Benefit (13)
Savings (Freed Monies) (14)
Savings (PV @ 8.00%)
47 678,092 54 317,728 62,224,294 70,188,600 78,754,237 87,959,412
6,797,374 7,895,530 8,927,555 9,951,377 10,975,198 12,394,134
12,547,006 13,843,345 15,035,896 16,147,148 17,485,304 19,033,111
--------------------- 
-------------------------
$67,022,472 $76,056,603 $86,187,745 $96,287,125 $107,214,739 $119,386,657
(14 285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(13,900 000) (14,595,000) (15,324,750) (16,090,988) (16,895,537) (17,740,314)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000
----------------------------------------------------------------
39,552,472 47,891,603 57,292,995 66,626,138 76,749,202 88,076,343
(13,108,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
0 0 0 (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990
0 0 0 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
----------- ====-------------------------------------------
27,235,462 32,787,593 42,188,985 31,500,775 41,623,840 52,950,981
(17,000,000) (17,000,000) (17,000,000) 0 0 00 0 0 (16,000 000) (16,000 000) (16,000 000)
0.00 0.00 0.00 1-97 E60 3.31
-------------- =-------------------------
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 25,623,840 36,950,981
0 0 0 0 (2,983,011) (7,424,382)
0 0 0 0 (19,986,244) (27,409,706)
-~------------------------------------
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 2,654,585 2,116,892
0 0 0 0 1,327,292 1,058,446
0 0 0 0 105,344,293 50,317,684
0, 0 0 0 0 0
----------------------------- 
--------
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 2,654,585 2,116,892
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 2,123,668 1,693,514
0 0 0 51,000,000 530,917 423,378
10,235,462 15,787,593 25,188,985 15,500,775 2,123,668 1,693,514
0 0 0 0 10,545,415 24,283,108
0 0 0 0 68,473,791 32,706,495
-------- ---------------------------
10,235,462 26,023,055 51,212,040 66,712,815 147,855,689 206,538,806
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
112,003,201 - - - -
42,700,000
FOOTNOTES: (See Last page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
1995
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prj t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (199 -1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO LEVERAGE
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (8)
Leverage Ca ability (9)
New Bond Debt Service
NET AVAILABLE AMOUNTS
City Split (80%)
Joint Purpose Monies (20%)
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM:
City Split Monies (10)
other Revenues (11)
Leveraged Amounts
Cummulative Housing Balance
Extra Monies Paid per A&C (12)
City Split Benefit (13)
Savings (Freed Monies) (14)
Savings (PV @ 8.00%)
FOOTNOTES: (See last page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
97,098,348 105 322,128 112,476,224 118,383,099 123,710,338 129,277,304 135,094,782
13 394,453 14,394,949 15,760,650 19,149,408 27,716,780 28,757,535 29,117,602
20,638,658 22 ,406,334 23,580,565 24,250,945 24,976,523 25,758,504 26,655,552
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
7
$131,131,459 $142,123,411 $151,817,439 $161,783,452 $176,403,641 $183,793,343 $190,867,936
(14,285,000) (14 285,000) (14 285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(18,627,329) (19,558,696) (20,536,631) (21,563,462) (22,641,635) (23,773,717) (24,962,403)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,0009,41 189,5 1,08 166,9 1,90 144,2 1,35----------
--98,934,130 -- 108,994,715 -117,710,808-- 126,649,990 --- 140,192,006 -- 146,449,626-- 152,335,533
(15 895,000) (15 895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075 000)
790 990 790,990 790,990 790,990
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
63,808,767 73,869,353 82,585,446 91,524,627
(15,895,000)
(21,075,000)
790,990
1,053,647
(15,895,000)
(21,075,000)
790,990
1,053,647
(15,895,000)
(21,075,000)
790,990
1,053,647
105,066,643 111,324,263 117,210,171
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(16,000 000) (16,000 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000)K.99 4.62 4.19 4.65 $.33 $.65 -. 95
47,808,767 57,869,353 62,885,446 71,824,627 85,366,643 91,624,263 97,510,171
(7,424,382) (7 424,382) 7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)(2,620:405) (6,746,1137) (36746,137) (6,746,137) (6,746,137) (6,746, 137) (6,746,137)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
7,763,979 13,698,833 18,714,926 27,654,108 41,196,124 47,453,744 53,339,651
3,881,990 6,849,417 9, 357,463 13,827,054 20,598,062 23, 726,872 26,669,826
76,226,540 35,223,466 33,131,134 33,366,544 34,363,251 35,871,483 37,192,034
0 0 (9,357,463) (13,827,054) (20,598,062) (23,726,872) (26,669,826)7 3 13,698,833 9,357,463 1 -------------------------------------------
7,763,979 13,698,833 9,357,463 13,827,054 20,598,062 23,726,872 26,669,826
6 211 184
1,552,796
10 959 067 7,485,971 11,061, 643 16, 478, 450 18,981, 498 21,335,860
2,739,767 1,871,493 2,765,411 4,119,612 4,745,374 5,333,965
6 211,184 10 959,067 7,485,971 11, 061,643 16,478,450 - -
31,836,021 39,101,167 47,285,074 51,545,892 38,003,876 31,746,256 25,860,349
49,547,251 22,895,253 21,535,237 21,688,253 22,336,113
-------------------------------------------- 
- - -
-
294,133,261 367,088,748 443,395,030 527,690,818 604,509,257 - -
0 0 0 0 4,509,257 31,746,256 25,860,349
0 0 0 0 0 18,981,498 21,335,860
-------------------------M ----------------------- ---
---------------
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Spcial Fund Deposit (5)P edged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Pr t.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO LEVERAGE
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (8)
Leverage Ca pability (9)
New Bond Debt Service
NET AVAILABLE AMOUNTS
City Split (80%)*
Joint Purpose Monies (20%)
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM:
City Split Monies (10)
Other Revenues (11)
Leveraged Amounts
Cummulative Housing Balance
Extra Monies Paid per A&C (12)
City Split Benefit (13)
Savings (Freed Monies) (14)
Savings (PV @ 8.00%)
FOOTNOTES: (See last page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
141 174,048 147,526,880 154,165,589 161,103,041 168,352,678 175,928,548 183,845,333
29,399,439 29,615,998 29,824,365 30,023,703 30,197,704 30,510,162 30,263,743
27,470,298 28,316,232 29,217,952 30,133,363 31,091,427 32,080,338 33,120,125
------------------------------ 
-------------------------------
$198,043,785 $205,459,110 $213,207,906 $221,260,107 $229,641,809 $238,519,048 $247,229,201
(14 285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(26,210,523) (27,521,049) (28,897,102) (30,341,957) (31,859,055) (33,452,007) (35,124,608)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000
-----------------------
==-------------------------------------
158,263,262 164,368,061 170,740,804 177,348,150 184,212,754 191,497,041 198,534,593
(15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790 990 790,990
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
--- ----------------------------------------------------------
123,137,899 129,242,698 135,615,442 142,222,788 149,087,392 156,371,678 163,409,231
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000)
6.25 6.56 6.88 t-.22 t-57 t.94 A.29
------------ ====------------------------------------
103,437,899 109,542,698 115,915,442 122,522,788 129,387,392 136,671,678 143,709,231
(7 424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)
(36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
59,267,380 65,372,179 71,744,922 78,352,268 85,216,872 92,501,159 99,538,711
29 633,690 32,686,089 35,872,461 39,176,134 42,608,436 46,250,579 49,769,356
38,640,113 41,002,458 39,613,621 29,479,950 47,754,825 58,024,231 60,321,060
(29,633,690) (32,686,089) (35,872,461) (39,176,134) (42,608,436) (46,250,579) (49,769,356)
29,633,690 32,686,089 35,872,461 39,176,134 42,608,436 46,250,579 49,769,356
23,706,952 26,148,872 28,697,969 31,340,907 34,086,749 37,000,463 39,815,485
5,926,738 6,537,218 7,174,492 7,835,227 8,521,687 9,250,116 9,953,871
18,487,185
18,487,185
(8,917,204)
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income ( )
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
SpeciaL Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prjt.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO LEVERAGE
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (8)
Leverage CapabiLity (9)
New Bond Debt Service
NET AVAILABLE AMOUNTS
City Split (80%)
Joint Purpose Monies (20%)
APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
192,118,373 200,763,700 209,798,066 219,238,979 229,104,733 239,414,446 250,188,096
27,878,024 28,123,689 28,228,605 28,338,600 27,527,425 23,014,176 23,112,081
34,226,291 35,663,218 38,768,467 41,966,945 43,185,173 44,452,130 45,769,766
$254,222,688 $264,550,607 $276,795,138 $289,544,524 $299,817,331 $306,880,752 $319,069,943
(14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000) (14,285,000)
(36,880,838) (38,724,880) (40,661,124) (42,694,180) (44,828,889) (47,070,334) (49,423,850)
715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 715,000 0 0
203,771,850 212,255,727 222,564,014 233,280,344 241,418,442 259,810,418 269,646,093
(15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000) (15,895,000)
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990 790,990
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
168,646,487 177,130,365 187,438,652 198,154,981 206,293,079 224,685,056 234,520,730
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700 000)
A.56 A.99 0.51 16.06 16.47 11.41 11.90
148,946,487 157,430,365 167,738,652 178,454,981 186,593,079 204,985,056 214,820,730
(7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)(36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
104,775,968 113,259,845 123,568,132 134,284,462 142,422,560 160,814,536 170,650,211
52,387,984 56,629,923 61,784,066 67,142,231 71,211,280 80,407,268 85,325,105
45,808,472 103,526,444 55,363,945 131,359,460 59,836,187 61,357,953 0
(52,387,984) (56,629,923) (61,784,066) (67,142,231) (71,211,280) (80,407,268) (85,325,105)
52,387,984 56,629,923 61,784,066 67,142,231 71,211,280 80,407,268 85,325,105
41,910,387 45,303,938 49,427,253 53,713,785 56,969,024 64,325,815 68,260,084
10,477,597 11,325,985 12,356,813 13,428,446 14,242,256 16,081,454 17,065,021
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM:
City Split Monies (10)
Other Revenues (11)
Leveraged Amounts
Cummulative Housing Balance
Extra Monies Paid per A&C (12)
City Split Benefit (13)
Savings (Freed Monies) (14)
Savings (PV @ 8.00%)
FOOTNOTES: (See last page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
EXISTING SUBLEASE
REVENUES:(1)
Pilot
Base Rent/Other
Residential
TOTAL:
1972 Debt Service
0 & M/Administrative (2)
1972 Reserve Income (3)
EXCESS REVENUE FUND ("ERF") AMTS:
1986 Bonds Debt Service
1987 HNYC Debt Service (4)
1986 Reserve Income
1987 Reserve Income
AVAILABLE AMOUNTS:
Special Fund Deposit (5)
Pledged Rev.for 1990 Debt Service
DCR on 1990 Bonds
2cnd TIER "ERF" AMOUNTS:
Prjt.Rev.Bds. Pmts (1991-1993) (6)
HNYC Debt Srv. (1990-1993) (7)
NET EXCESS APPLIED TO LEVERAGE
Max. Avail. for Debt Service (8)
Leverage Capability (9)
New Bond Debt Service
NET AVAILABLE AMOUNTS
City Split (80%)
Joint Purpose Monies (20%)
APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO - - COMPLETE FINANCIALS
2017 2018 2019 2020
261,446,560 273,211,656 285,506,180 298,353,958
21,187,106 21, 221,797 21,258,572 9,541,630
47,140,107 48,565,262 50,047,422 51,588,870
$329,773,773 $342,998,715 $356,812,174 $359,484,458
(51,895,043) (54,489,795) (57,214,285) (60,074,999)
0 0 0 0
277,878,730 288,508,920 299,597,889 299,409,459
0 0 0 0
(21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000) (21,075,000)
0 0 0 0
1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647 1,053,647
257,857,378 268,487,567 279,576,537 279,388,106
0 0 0 0
(19,700 000) (19,700 000) (19,700000) 1000)
13.09 13.63 14.19 (1 -18
238,157,378 248,787,567 259,876,537 259,688,106
(7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382) (7,424,382)(36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137) (36,746,137)
193,986,858 204,617,048 215,706,017 215,517,587
96,993,429 102,308,524 107,853,009 107,758,793
0 0 0 0
(96,993,429) (102,308,524) (107,758,793) (107,758,793)
96,993,429 102,308,524 107,947,224 107,758,793
77,594,743 81,846,819 86,357,779 86,207,035
19,398,686 20,461,705 21,589,445 21,551,759
NEW HOUSING PROGRAM:
City Split Monies (10)
Other Revenues (11)
Leveraged Amounts
Cummulative Housing Balance
Extra Monies Paid per A&C (12)
City Split Benefit (13)
Savings (Freed Monies) (14)
Savings (PV @ 8.00%)
FOOTNOTES: (See last page)
Source: Tom Oppenheim, M.I.T. CRED
FOOTNOTES:
(1) Derived from 1990 Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. BPCA Pro Forma Cash Flow Study. These figures reflect only those
revenues derived from Existing Sublease Revenues and do not include Post-1986 leases, Transaction payments, New leases,
Lump Sum Payments or Future Revenues. Assumed growth rate is 4.5% per year from 2000-2020.
(2) The 1990 O&M/Administrative budgeted amounts is $13,900,000 with a 5% growth rate for the remaining
years. Source: 1990 Official Statement.
(3) Reserve Fund Deposit amount is $14,300,000 which approximates the original deposit to the reserve fund.
The deposits for the 1986 and 1987 reserve funds are $15 819,802 and $21,072,949 respectively. These amounts
also represent original deposit amounts and all reserve funds assume an investment earning rate of 5%.
(4) Pursuant to the Ammendment to First Dedication Instrument dated 9/15/1987, capitalized interest was extended
to cover interest through 1992 on the 1987 HNYC bonds. Assume first principal and interest payment to occur in 1993.
(5) Pursuant to the 1990 Revenue Bond Resolution, excess revenue funds available are to deposited.into a Special Fund
so that the amount is not in excess of $17 million in 1990, $34 million in 1991, and $51 million in 1992.
The purpose is to provide additional coverage in case of insufficient revenues and the monies are available
for any purpose the City and Authority jointly decide. The anlysis assumes that the monies are deosited
in the Fund for three years and then are released as Joint Purpose Monies in.1993 as reflected by the $51 million in
Joint Purpose Monies in 1993 plus the traditional split that occurs from Available Amounts. During the years 1990-1992
the analysis assumes that remaining Available Amounts go to the City as the deposit to the Special Fund represents the use
that the BPCA and the City decide for Joint Purpose Monies.
(6) Assumes BPCA anticipated future infrastructure financings of $22.5 million and $33.5 million net proceeds in 1991 and
1992 respectively. Net Proceeds account for 67% of bonds issued to account for three years of capitalized interest,
costs of issuance, and reserve fund deposits.
(7) Assumes HNYC anticipated future financings for the Housing New York Program of $140 million $52 million,$36.5 million, and $28.9 million in net proceeds for the consecutive years commencing in 1900 and ending in 1993.
Net Proceeds account for 62.22% of bonds issued to account for four years of capitalized interest, costs of issuance,
reserve fund deposits.
(8) Assumes a conservative 2 times debt coverage ratio.0
(9) Assumes the first year leveraged amounts could be issued would be 1994 after anticipated future financings are complete.
Assumes 3 years of capitalized interes thus coverage begins in 2004.
(10) Remaining city split monies are applied until 2000 for the new hsg. program. Additionally the $50 million remittance to the
City obligation under the 1989 A&C is assumed to be paid to the new housing program. The $0 million is fulfilled in
the year 1992 and is shown as City split amounts.
(11) These are the same amounts of extra revenues needed under the Base Case scenario that are applied to the new hsg.
program. Note that after 2000 these monies are no longer necessary and represent the amount of freed monies under
this scenario.
(12) These represent the additional amounts that were paid from other revenue sources under the Base Case scenario in years
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 that were not required under the alternative leverage scenerio.
(13) These amounts are city split benefits that are available to the city in the years 2001 and 2002
as a result of early fulfillment of hsg -program. The $8.9 million represents the greater city split amounts that
are realized in year 2003 under the M.8.U. scenario as a result of no debt service requirements.
(14) These are the monies that are freed early (net city benefits and the other revenues)for other non housing uses
under the leveraged scenario due to early fulfillment of housing program in 2000.
* All figures derived from 1986 and 1990 Battery Park City Authority Official Statements, as well
as the 1987 Housing New York Corporation Official Statement. A&C annual cash payments
are derived from the 1989 Agreement and Consent Document.
